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Introduction:
In the year 2020, politics are en vogue -- both literally and figuratively. People want to
flip through fashion magazines and see articles about current events and activism, not just
pictures of beautiful things. There is a focus, especially within the realm of art and culture, to
support sustainability, feminism, anti-racism, LGBTQ+ rights, etc. In the age of 'ethical
capitalism' it feels as though politics, or at least what we colloquially refer to as politics, has
engulfed the aesthetic realm. On the surface, this seems to be a movement in the right direction
away from inequality, but upon further analysis I hope to show you that we have many reasons to
be wary of this shift. Using the works of aesthetic and political philosopher Jacques Rancière, I
will attempt to explain what exactly is meant by aesthetics, discuss the politics of aesthetics, and
differentiate between political discourse and ethical discourse.
One of the most troubling consequences of this shift for me, as a student of gender and
aesthetic philosophy, has been the direction feminism has gone in the 21st century. 'Feminism' as
we know it today feels entirely stripped of its political power. This hollowing of feminism can be
attributed to a number of factors. Some might point to its commodification as the culprit, but I
see this as a byproduct of what is actually at the core of the problem: an ethical shift. Commodity
feminism has flourished in the wake of feminism's depoliticization because it seems to be one of
the only avenues left to practice 'feminism.' The political nature of feminism -- the discussions
about who is being counted for within the political community and who is not -- have been
paralyzed by a discourse of victimhood. As a woman myself, my studies have been motivated by
a desire to reject this victimhood. While I always have been passionate about the project of
equality, in recent years I have become more and more uncomfortable with labeling myself with
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the title of 'feminist.' This became even more the case after the Me Too movement which has
dominated cultural and political discourse for the past three years. It increasingly feels as though
to be a woman, and to be a feminist, one must also accept that they are a victim.
This new feminist shift can be found within the culture industry and aesthetic politics. As
it has moved away from politics proper, it has found a foothold in the culture of capitalism. In
the aesthetics of politics the focus has been on getting more women in office or allowing women
to make as much money as men. The most notable 'thinker' of this wave is a former COO of a
Fortune 500 company who encouraged women to further their careers. The Me Too movement
has focused much more on getting sexual criminals punished and deplatformed than passing
legislation and encouraging education. To say that feminism has been depoliticized does not
mean it has entirely abdicated the realm of politics proper, but it is to say that it only exists
within politics proper on an aesthetic level. While the aesthetics of politics in this new era is of
interest, what I will mostly be undertaking is the ethical shift within the aesthetic realm. This
new feminism is much more easily recognizable within the artistic and cultural realm; it is
clearly present in almost all film, music, media, etc. that is produced nowadays. The aesthetic
realm is ripe with examples, and also arguably more impactful on identity formation. As a young
person coming of age in the 21st century, it was through media that I first became acquainted
with what we call feminism today. Moreover, film, which is arguably the ultimate artistic
medium of the aesthetic age, will be the focus of my elucidations.
In the first chapter I will be looking to the three different artistic regimes that Rancière
delineates. Although these three regimes are not teleologically ordered -- they can all be at play
simultaneously -- the aesthetic regime is a fairly newer way of looking at art compared to the
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other two. The ethical regime of images is associated with the ideas of Plato, and the
representative regime with his successor Aristotle. The aesthetic revolution, ushered in by
philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Schiller, gave art autonomy for the first time.
To even discuss the topic of art we must first understand the difference between 'arts' and 'art.' I
will then discuss the outcomes of the aesthetic revolution, and delve into the politics of aesthetics
in further detail. The important link between autonomy and heteronomy within the aesthetic
regime will be laid out, and I will explore some of Rancière's critiques of different conceptions
of modern art.
In my next chapter I will look at what Rancière calls the ethical turn. Not to be confused
with the ethical regime of images, the ethical turn is a way of depoliticizing both politics and
aesthetics. First, I will unpack Rancière's discussion of human rights to better understand how
politics and it's opposite -- the police -- work within politics proper. This text will also provide a
good background for the motivations of the ethical turn and the modern notion of victimhood. I
will then turn to Rancière's critique of Jean-François Lyotard's aesthetics of the sublime in

order to provide context for the foundations of the ethical turn within the aesthetic regime.
Using the films Dogville and Mystic River, I will attempt to illustrate what this ethical turn looks
like within the aesthetic realm, and I will discuss the War on Terror in order to do the same with
the political realm. Lastly, I will turn to Sophocles' Antigone and discuss her significance as a
heroine of the ethical turn.
In my final chapter, I will be undertaking a critique of feminism and 'feminist' art in the
21st century using Rancière's framework. I will first discuss the different waves of feminism and
the ways in which I believe feminism turned into 'feminism.' Looking to Tina Chanter's
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discussion of feminist art collective, Geurilla Girls, I will question the dissensual value of
feminist art which is rooted in gender essentialism. This will provide an example of a
heteronomous approach to feminist art; showing what happens when you dissolve art into life -specifically in this case a life dominated by capital. I will then discuss the symbolic rupture that I
believe to have occured in the wake of the New York Times' article on the sexual crimes of
former film producer Harvey Weinstien. Within the context of the ethical turn, the concepts of
consensus and victimhood are both vitally important. While the first part of this chapter attempts
to lay out the consensual nature of the feminist culture industry, the second will provide an
understanding of what it means to be a victim. First, I will discuss the aesthetics of the political
event that was the Me Too movement. Then, using Kaja Silverman's analysis of the male gaze I
will differentiate between the gaze and the look within the context of gender relations. I will
discuss how the refusal to speak about and understand libidinal desire has linked infinite trauma
with human sexuality. Lastly, I will do an analysis of rape-revenge fantasy film Promising Young
Woman in order to illustrate how this sexual ethics looks within art.

6

Chapter 1- The Artistic Regimes
Although art is thought to be as old as humanity itself, some thinkers argue that art did
not become 'art' until the aesthetic revolution. Before the aesthetic revolution, art played a much
more instrumental role in day to day life -- often serving some sort of religious or pedagogical
purpose. In modern times we see the rise and veneration of artists like Marcel Duchamp, who
managed to make a urinal into what is considered one of the most iconic pieces of 20th century
art. How can we account for this shift in what we now call art? In his text, The Politics of
Aesthetics, R
 ancière details the three major regimes which have functioned throughout history to
identify the arts and art.
The first regime is one Rancière will call "the ethical regime of images," (Rancière 2004:
20). Rancière closely associates this regime with Platonic thought, as in this regime "'art’ is not
identified as such but is subsumed under the question of images." (Rancière 2004: 20). Plato sees
the artist as ultimately inferior to the philosopher, as the philosopher is committed to the truth.
Meanwhile, the artist can only produce images that attempt to get at the truth. Images are not
only inferior to philosophy in this regime, but in some ways there is a suggestion that images are
actively working against the ultimate aim of philosophy by obscuring the truth from us. The idea
will always triumph over the image as the image is essentially just a confused idea. Images can
serve some sort of purpose for Plato, but only in the grand scheme of larger political or ethical
goals. Under the ethical regime of images, art is understood to be aimed at some specific end.
Rancière further elaborates on this Platonic conception:
"And it is among these that he traces the dividing line: there are true arts, that is to say
forms of knowledge based on the imitation of a model with precise ends, and artistic
simulacra that imitate simple appearances. These imitations, differentiated by their origin,
are then distinguished by their end or purpose… In this regime, it is a matter of knowing
in what way images’ mode of being affects the ethos, the mode of being of individuals
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and communities. This question prevents 'art' from individualizing itself as such."
(Rancière 2004: 21)
There is a very economic sense around how art is treated in this regime. Evaluating art centers
much more around artisanship than artistry -- the question becomes what is the utility of this
object within the greater political community. Thus, art can never be removed from its
educational (and consequently political) context. Another feature of this regime is that works of
art have no autonomy -- they are always subject to the rule imposed by the idea. Rancière denies
the critique that Plato placed "art under the yoke of politics." (Rancière 2004: 21), because art for
Plato did not actually exist. Plato sees the image produced by mimesis as dangerous not only
because it corrupts the truth, but because "the magician confuses the social order, the division of
labour that supports the hierarchy he sets up between images and truth, confining workers to a
single role, which excludes them from participating in political deliberation." (Chanter 2018: 85).
Under the Platonic social order, those who make 'art' are not artists at all, they are either
craftsmen or workers who exist to serve the ends of politicians, and they have no avenue to
practice politics. It is important to note what the word Ethics means for Rancière, as many of the
following arguments will discuss it. The ethical regime of images is not to be understood as
synonymous to the ethical turn which is at the center of this thesis. When he discusses the ethical
regime here, it stems from a conception of ethos as "the mode of being of individuals and
communities." (Rancière 2004: 21) A Platonic conception of art is interested in regulating the
mode of being of the individuals who make up a society through the arts.
The second regime that Rancière identifies is the representative regime of images,
associated with Aristotle's Poetics. This regime breaks away from the first ethical regime in
identifying "the substance of art - or rather of the arts - in the couple poiesis mimesis. " (Rancière
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2004: 21) It is important to note that in this regime, arts only appear in the plural. One decisive
shift from Plato to Aristotle was that in Plato there is no art or arts, properly speaking, they get
subsumed under the ethical regime of images. They are seen as activities and not validated
within themselves, but rather evaluated by whether they are affirmative of the community or not.
Whereas in Aristotle we see this shift towards at least recognizing the arts as τέχνη. That being
said, the arts are not yet associated with the autonomy that would denote them as Art -- an entity
with its own end. Rather, the arts function to provide predetermined ways of remaking
predetermined realities through mimesis.
The internal structure of the arts within this regime also becomes very important. In the
Poetics , Aristotle is exclusively concerned with tragedy. He is not only trying to establish that
the arts, such as tragedy, can claim a realm that is no longer subsumed under any other realm, but
is also trying to show that it is a realm which is built upon a very specific internal structure. This
structure is what truly decides whether what you have in front of you is a good or bad tragedy. In
many ways, what you have in Aristotle's Poetics is a manual: how to write a good tragedy. In
order to do so, one must pay attention to how something like a tragedy has to be internally
composed. In Aristotle, the way in which he conceives of the internal structure of the tragedy is
ultimately hierarchical, and this internal hierarchy of the tragedy is reflective of social
hierarchies. This hierarchical nature of the representative regime is a key feature for Rancière,
who writes that:
"The representative primacy of action over characters or of narration over description, the
hierarchy of genres according to the dignity of their subject matter, and the very primacy
of the art of speaking, of speech in actuality, all of these elements figure into an analogy
with a fully hierarchical vision of the community." (Rancière 2004: 22)
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The internal logic of the arts within this regime is always a mirror of the logic present
within society. This hierarchical nature of tragedy is something that holds, for him, up to the 18th
century. The tragedy was strictly seen as something for the noble people to participate in and
enjoy, while the commoners were allowed the comedy. One pertinent example of the way in
which the representative regime functions is the struggle of the playwright Pierre Corneille to
rewrite the story of Oedipus. The ancient Greek version of Oedipus written by Sophocles is very
bloody and sordid, and while Corneille found the story of Oedipus to be very compelling, he
could not do what the ancient Greeks did because this would violate the taste of nobility.
Rancière explains that, "Sophocles' Oedipus was literally unrepresentable on the French stage for
three reasons: the physical horror provoked by Oedipus's gouged-out eyes; a surplus of oracles,
which anticipate the unfoldíng of the plot; and the absence of a love story." (Rancière 2003: 112)
Corneille then, in response to these troubles took out the gouging and the oracles delivered by
Tireseas, and added a love interest. Corneille's trouble was not so much about preserving "female
sensitivities" or "an empirical relationship with the audience of his time," but rather about
"representation as such. It concerns mimesis as a relationship between two terms: a poiesís and
an aesthesis -- that is, a way of making and an economy of affects." (Rancière 2003: 112) The
three changes that Rancière points out create an imbalance in the visible and the intelligible. A
great deal of the story is made intelligible by the Oracles and the gouging of the eyes, and
viewers are thought to be made aware of too much too soon. The surplus of the visible imposes
itself and allows the intelligible to impose itself beyond the economy of affects that the
playwright is controlling. By introducing a love interest he also gives himself even further
control over the plot via adding new characters who will better translate the message into one he
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feels is acceptable. The play that Corneille wrote under the yoke of the representative regime had
the burden of mirroring society at the time. When it was written, the nobility did not engage in
the acts depicted in the original version of Oedipus, so Corneille was tasked with creating a play
that kept the message of the play intact but warped it in a way to mirror the societal norms
present in 17th century France. Corneille's changes address the missing link "between what is
visible and what is intelligible… a specific type of interest capable of ensuring a suitable
relationship between the seen and the unseen, the known and the unknown, the expected and the
unexpected; and also of adjusting the relationship of distance and proximity between stage and
auditorium."(Rancière 2003: 112-3)
Mimesis, for Aristotle, was no longer a dangerous force as it was for Plato, rather it
played a central role in representation. And what exactly is 'representation?' It is to be understood
as a constraint in which 'the visible' is dependent upon speech. "Two operations are fused: an
operation of substitution" and "an operation of exhibition." (Rancière 2003: 113) It takes our
reality and substitutes it for something we were not already aware of, all while
under-representing that which it attempts to put before us. It does this by producing a "sublime
impression" in which we are not able "to see the forms [the representations] evoke and effect to
show us." (Rancière 2003: 114) Representation functions to order our perception of reality and
deploy meaning upon that which it interacts with -- the power supposedly comes from the
sensible itself. Aristotle's major break from Plato was that he wanted to 'extract tragedy' from the
world of Plato and use it to construct 'an order of representation' in which the 'ethical pathos of
knowledge' is transferred 'into a stable relationship between 'poiesis' or 'an autonomous
arrangement of actions,' and 'aesthesis,' or 'the bringing into operation of affects.' (Rancière 2003:
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115) The mimetic principle here is thus not to be understood as some directive claiming that all
art must necessarily convey the social order or uphold truth. While Plato always saw
representation as disordering to the social construction, Aristotle saw its possible power in
regulating the affects of society and deciding "within this framework, as good or bad, adequate
or inadequate: partitions between the representable and the unrepresentable." (Rancière 2004:
22) It is then, in this regime, that anything 'unrepresentable' belongs. This is the regime that
decides what is proper to represent and the proper way to represent such things. The constraint of
mimesis here is not to be confused with a constraint of resemblance. It does not inherently
function to police how closely a painting of a bowl of fruit resembles a physical bowl of fruit;
rather, it sets out to decide how acceptable it is to represent a bowl of fruit in the first place and
bring about a certain affect in the people who interact with it. It is not a method of making art,
but rather a regime that "renders the arts autonomous," and "links this autonomy to a general
order of occupations and ways of doing and making." (Rancière 2004: 22)
The third regime Rancière identifies is the aesthetic regime. In it, "artistic phenomena are
identified by their adherence to a specific regime of the sensible, which is extricated from its
ordinary connections and is inhabited by a heterogeneous power, the power of a form of thought
that has become foreign to itself." (Rancière 2004: 23) In this regime, autonomy and heteronomy
are bonded together -- while the work of art is given autonomy, there is also autonomy within the
mode of experience. Rancière elaborates even further upon this in The Aesthetic Revolution and
Its Outcomes, asserting that, "In the aesthetic regime of art, art is art to the extent that it is
something else than art." (Rancière 2010: 118) This is in contrast to a conception of art which
states that art is only art (and art is only political) if "it produces objects that, both in texture and
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the way we experience them, have a radically different status to objects of consumption."
(Rancière 2009: 96) Rancière is not concerned with gatekeeping art in any similar manner -- he
understands that the possibility of keeping life and art separate in the aesthetic regime is
impossible. It is free from the hierarchies and rules of the other two regimes. This is the regime
ushered in by the Kantian Genius who produces art without a law. The artist is a mere
passageway from nature to art -- there is no consideration of social order, the ethical ends of the
art, or the representability of the art. The aesthetic regime of art brings about the "elimination of
a boundary that restricts the available choice of representable subjects and ways of representing
them." (Rancière 2009: 126) It is also important to note that in this regime, not only is what we
can represent no longer regulated, but how we represent them is also freed. This is the regime
that ushered in our modern conception of art -- the regime in which a banana taped to a wall can
be shown at Art Basel. What was once seen as just a fruit and a piece of duct tape can instead be
cultural commentary on how we ascribe monetary and social worth to objects. While some may
scoff at such creations, one could argue that the piece of art which caused so much discussion
(and the subsequent performance artist who took it off the wall and ate it) managed to
redistribute the sensible and question what Rancière will call the police order. Politics is brought
about via dissensus, while the police order is confirmed through consensus. "Politics, as the
opposite of the police, is a form of dissensus that polemically confirms the axiom of
equality—the only political axiom for him." (Guénoun 2009: 177)
At this point, it might be relevant to take recourse to Rancière's theses on politics to better
understand this relationship. In the 7th thesis Rancière states that: "Politics stands in distinct
opposition to the police. The police is a distribution of the sensible whose principle is the
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absence of void and supplement." (Rancière 2010: 36) The police order is to be understood in
terms of consensus, and for Rancière, consensus means much more than we usually attribute to
it. Consensus thinks that it is possible to structure society in such a way that everybody is
included. For this reason, contemporary Western democracies are emblematic of consensual
political orders and as a result, they are not really democracies within this framework. Here
democracy refers to the demos, and the demos is made up of a group of people who have been
counted out by the status quo. These voiceless people, at some point, enter the stage of politics
and show that they have a voice too. It is only through those that are excluded that the possibility
of universalization can be brought about. The consensual structure sells the story that everything
can be resolved by the police order, and that everyone is included in the police order.
The police order "consists, before all else, in recalling the obviousness of what there is, or
rather of what there is not, and its slogan is: 'Move along! There's nothing to see here!' The
police is that which says that here, on this street, there's nothing to see and so nothing to do but
move along. It asserts that the space for circulating is nothing but the space of circulation."
(Rancière 2010: 37) One can see consensus at play within most bureaucratic structures.
Bureaucracy claims to have rules and solutions for any problem that arises. There is never any
interruption within the order because the order is always thought to plan for and support all
possible happenings within it. Of course, we see how it is rarely the case that a police order
actually functions to do this. The pandemic of 2020 has shone a light on the acute failings of the
police order to account for everything. Bureaucracies all over the world are floundering to come
up with resolutions that solve everyone's problems merely through administrative steps. A
moment like this one shines a particularly bright light on the fact that the system was very much
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not built to include everyone and everything. And, of course, the message from those institutions
is that we should not question any of the steps being taken, but rather have faith that the system
will be able to solve all the problems.
If the essence of the police is consensus, the essence of politics is dissensus. Dissensus is
not to be understood as "a confrontation between interests or opinions. It is the demonstration
(manifestation) of a gap in the sensible itself." (Rancière 2010: 38) Anything that functions to do
this is engaging in politics (or in the case of art, inviting the engagement of politics) by making
visible this gap and functioning to redistribute the sensible. Politics "consists in transforming this
space of 'moving-along', of circulation, into a space for the appearance of a subject: the people,
the workers, the citizens. It consists in re-figuring space, that is in what is to be done, to be seen
and to be named in it. It is the instituting of a dispute over the distribution of the sensible, over
that nemein that finds every nomos of the community." (Rancière 2010: 37) The pandemic we
are facing has managed to put those on the stage who were formerly fairly uncounted for. Those
we like to call 'unskilled' laborers -- pharmacists, grocers, delivery people, nurses, etc. -- are the
people currently holding our world together. In the United States, we have seen mayors and
governors step in and provide free child care and emergency benefits to these 'unskilled' laborers
because of how immensely we are relying upon their abilities to do their jobs. The true skill and
importance of these people within our community is finally being brought to the stage. That
being said, it is important to note that political dissensus is not synonymous to aesthetic
dissensus. While the situation I discuss above has the ability of bringing forth progress, aesthetic
dissensus is to be understood in a different fashion.
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The question then arises, what exactly is the outcome of this aesthetic dissensus? Can it
ever reach some sort of resolution? The answer is no. You have to keep dissensus going; this is
important because art must never be directly political. There exists a crucial distinction between
aesthetic dissensus and political dissensus. So then the question then becomes, if art is
dissensual, and politics is dissensual, how can we differentiate between these two forms of
dissensus? Now what art does, if art is dissensual (and it can only be dissensual if it maintains
the paradoxical conjunction between art and life) is that it restructures the sensible texture that is
constitutive of what we perceive and understand as our world. But art itself is not transformative
of that. What art is capable of doing is offering certain sites at which politics can intervene and
build from there. For Rancière, politics in the political realm functions on two preconditions. The
first is that politics is always collective -- there is no individual politics. Secondly, politics must
always include an appeal to universality. In politics we find a process that Rancière associates
with subjectification in which individuals are turned into a collective. Modern art does not
operate at the level of individuals, it rather operates at the pre-individual level. Aesthetic
dissensus is not the same as political dissensus because political dissensus requires collectivity -it requires organization. Therefore, aesthetic dissensus must constantly play out in order to allow
politics to build. Aesthetic dissensus itself can never account for progress; it is characterized by a
certain inactivity that comes out of maintaining the paradoxical knot between art and life.
It bears discussing in further details the consequences of the aesthetic regime. Rancière
explains that the "aesthetic experience will bear the art of the beautiful and the art of the living…
The aesthetic experience is effective inasmuch as it is the experience of that and. '' (Rancière
2010: 116) What exactly does that mean for Rancière? He sees an unavoidable, paradoxical
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conjunction between art and life, and opposes the different ways of understanding the aesthetic
regime that do not maintain this knot. Art is no longer a specific craft that is subsumed under
some social order, art takes on its own autonomous life and has the ability to give itself its own
laws. This is not unique to the aesthetic regime. There is a connection between art and society in
the representative regime as well, but there it is a mirroring -- one is to mirror the other.
Whereas, in the aesthetic revolution art is given more freedom to play with life. But, this is not to
say that art exists devoid of any influence or rule from the dominant social order. This creates a
conflict in which the nuances of the aesthetic regime lie. Art then functions to affect life and life
functions to affect art. The politics of art is to be found precisely in this conjunction, as for
Rancière, politics is always conflictual.

The relationship between autonomy and heteronomy can be summed up in three points
coming from Schiller's formula for the original scene of aesthetics: "First, the autonomy staged
by the aesthetic regime of art is not that of the work of art but a mode of experience." Schiller

17

demonstrates this by discussing a statue of a goddess called the Juno Ludovisi (shown above).
The goddess bears "no trace of will or aim," because "the qualities of the goddess are those of the
statue as well." (Rancière 2010:117) While she was obviously created by someone, she also does
not outwardly demonstrate that will as she herself embodies the goddess. The artist's intention
does not at all show in the goddess, and she sends no real message. We know this to not be the
case. Of course someone had to take a slab of marble and turn it into something resembling a
goddess, but if one divorced logic from the situation they would not be able to explain why the
slab of artist was meant to resemble a goddess. It has all the same qualities of any slab of marble
you can find in nature, other than the fact it is differently shaped. The feeling when I interact
with it is not brought about by the marble, it is brought about by the experience of interacting
with the marble.
The second point is that "the aesthetic experience is one of heterogeneity, such that, for
the subject of that experience, it is also the dismissal of a certain autonomy." (Rancière 2010:
117) In this interaction with the Juno Ludovisi, I enjoy a negative sort of autonomy. This
autonomy comes from the communicability of aesthetic universality. When I stand in front of a
painting, my sensory faculties and my cognitive faculties engage in a free (dissensual) play that
leads me to a heterogenous experience. The work of art has an autonomy that imposes its
heterogeneity onto me. My experience with the piece of art is not only my own. There exists the
possibility of aesthetic universalizability -- it is why I am able to have discussions about a work
of art with someone else. Regardless of the fact that the material work of art has no free will
itself, it is able to impose a heterogeneity onto its spectators. This is a situation in which the
autonomy of reason that I regularly feel in non-aesthetic experiences is overtaken by my
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sensibilities. This autonomy is paradoxically related to a withdrawal of power. As the
understanding becomes subsumed underneath the free appearance we are shown frontiers our
mind has never before been able to process, as our understanding is not capable of accessing
those experiences alone. While engaging with the Juno Ludovisi "the goddess and the spectator,
the free play and the free appearance, are caught up together in a specific sensorium, cancelling
the oppositions of activity and passivity, will and resistance." (Rancière 2010: 117) It is at this
moment that politics occurs.
To elucidate this particular idea, it would be beneficial to note how Rancière comes to
understand this autonomy through his reading of Kant's third critique. When Kant discusses the
interaction of the faculties, he calls it a free harmonious play of the faculties -- this is what
accounts for our experience of the beautiful within Kant. Rancière has a very specific
understanding of this free play of the understanding and the imagination. He does not read the
qualification of harmonious in a traditional way, but rather reads it in a dissensual manner. It is
not the case that we have a sort of harmony that is established; what we undergo is a dissensual
play that remains conflictual. The understanding and imagination in Kant enter into a
"harmonious" play, but that play does not bring about any point of culmination. Kant is clear to
point out that the play continues, and it continues by means of mutual enrichment. The beautiful
involves "the facilitated play of both powers of the mind (imagination and understanding)
enlivened through mutual agreement." (Kant 1790: 104) This play is both ongoing and mutually
enriching, because of the backdrop of conflict between these two faculties. Their consensus is
not desirable because their consensus implies stasis. Rather, their engagement allows for constant
challenging of each other -- this is what Rancière sees as a dissensual relationship. "In the
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Kantian analysis, free play and free appearance suspend the power of form over matter, of
intelligence over sensibility." (Rancière 2009: 30-31)
The power of form over matter is done away with, but this does not mean that matter now
has power over form. The free play is an activity with no goal or end -- no governing body or
rule to be subsumed under. Moreover, the suspension of the power of understanding present in
the free play, is "correlated to another suspension, namely the suspension of [the viewers] own
powers before the appearance of the 'idle' work, the work which, like the goddess, owes its
unprecedented perfection to the fact that the will is withdrawn from its appearing." (Rancière
2009: 30) The free play and free appearance are able to foster new communities precisely
because of this very particular reading of Kant's experience of the beautiful as a challenge of the
status quo. They serve to refute, within the current sensible, the subsuming of sensible matter
under intelligible form, and instead allow form and matter to mutually enrich each other. The
aesthetic process becomes political for Rancière because the opposition between form and matter
also signifies "a difference between two humanities." (Rancière 2009: 31) Form and matter, for
Rancière, is not merely an artistic opposition, it also serves to symbolize a domination of the
police order over common sense. It is thus through a mutual enrichment of activity and passivity
that the police order is challenged.
The third and final point is that "the object of that experience is aesthetic insofar as it is
not, or at least not only, art." (Rancière 2010: 117) This is important for Rancière because it
illustrates one of the key differences of the aesthetic regime from the other regimes. For an
artwork to fit within the aesthetic regime, it must be more than mere mimesis or ethical end -- it
has to offer a free appearance which posits a new form of life that is not separated into spheres.

20

What Rancière seems to be getting at when he says, "art is art to the extent that it is something
else other than art [in the aesthetic regime]," (Rancière 2010: 118) is that art has to have a certain
autonomy. It cannot be beholden to any particular form or will. Instead of passive matter being
beholden to active form, the aesthetic experience is created in the midst of their contradiction.
The statue stops performing the function of representing a goddess and instead can be a piece of
artwork which we have the freedom to understand as a multitude of things. Man undergoes an
"emancipation from materiality," (Rancière 2010: 118) by being able to look at the statue for
more than just its function -- and through free play of reason and understanding, he is able to
arrive to a conception of it that has political or societal connotations beyond anything the artist
may have intended. This aestheticization is characterized by one key formula for Rancière: "art is
an autonomous form of life." (Rancière 2010: 118) There are multiple ways of understanding
modern art, though. The autonomist conception valorizes autonomy over life and the
heteronomous conception valorizes life over autonomy. Rancière will oppose both these ways of
understanding. A discussion of his oppositions will help us better understand the relationship
Rancière imagines between politics and art. He will also oppose the postmodern conception of
understanding modern art, but that will be better understood within the context of later
discussions on the ethical turn.
The autonomist or modernist conception of art claims that art is to be understood
exclusively in terms of autonomy -- that is, in terms of art as an entity that is capable of giving
itself its own laws. It gives itself its own laws on the basis of the specific medium in which and
with which it works. The claim by modernists is that once art turns modern, each art basically
tries to develop and elaborate its own laws on the basis of its own medium. Rancière sees
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Clement Greenberg's thinking to be emblematic of the problems of the autonomist conception.
Art for art's sake was to be understood by Greenberg as “expression of the absolute,” in which
the absolute is the process where "content becomes something to be avoided like the plague."
(Greenberg 1961: 5) This is a problem for Rancière because it leads, ultimately, to an end of art.
The paradoxical bond between art and life must be preserved, because any attempt at dissolving
this bond or resolving this bond ultimately leads to the dissolution of both terms. What
Greenberg and his fellow modernists sought to move past was "historical modernism in general,
the idea of a new art attuned to all the vibrations of universal life: an art capable of both
matching the accelerated rhythms of industry, society, and urban life, and of giving infinite
resonance to the most ordinary minutes of everyday life." (Rancière 2011: 262) Greenberg seems
to suggest that it is possible to conceive of an art that is in utter opposition to commodified
society or kitch. To understand art exclusively in terms of its autonomy, according to Greenberg,
allows art to be free from the evils of capitalism. Capitalism had managed to seep into life,
therefore art itself must be entirely removed from life if it wishes to avoid commodification. The
complete "autonomy of art' replaces any concepts of conscious experience with the processes of
the medium and form: a novel about the novel, a painting about painting… Autonomy, as the
operation of the self-constrained artistic system that implodes the artwork, lends it depth. There
is only one destination: nowhere." (Chowdhury 2019) This ultimately ends up being the issue
with modernist art, there is no longer any free play of understanding and sensibility as sensibility
possesses all of the autonomy. When art is nothing but art, it no longer is able to participate in
politics, and the impact of life on art is done away with. It is also crucially no longer part of the
aesthetic experience as it no longer encapsulates the art of the living. The modernist
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understanding tries to dissolve the notion of politics and ends up dissolving art along with it. Art
then becomes an entirely ideological venture.
The heteronomous conception of modern art is often associated with different
avant-garde movements, and the goal of these movements was to dissolve art into life. The art
that they attempted to create was not for the sake of art, it was supposed to be transformative of
the very society in which it was produced. There are two moves that occur here. First, the
aesthetic experience becomes confused with the work of art itself. Second, the historicity of the
work of art becomes clear precisely because the will of the artist is also the form of the work of
art. When we look at the Juno Ludovisi we know the historical context of it. The artist was
limited in expressing divinity, so when we look at the work of art we understand his limits and
how they were informed by his idea and his people. The artwork is deprived of any autonomy
and is instead a mere reflection of the society that created it. Under this mode of thinking, "Art
lives so long as it expresses a thought unclear to itself in a manner that resists it. It lives
inasmuch as it is something other than art, namely a belief and a way of life." (Rancière 2010:
123) There is no longer a struggle to materially express our thoughts -- suddenly, art becomes
nothing more than the autonomy of the artist. As art loses its value, many forms of art become
redundant, although the spirit of forms remains. Form becomes universal and can be found
anywhere, in anything. In this case, modern art is nothing more than a political message. If you
dissolve modern art into politics, it is not simply that you dissolve art, but what is at the same
time dissolved is the notion of politics. Rancière explains that, "the notion of 'art becoming life'
does not simply foster demiurgic projects of a 'new life'. It also weaves a common temporality of
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art which can be encapsulated in a simple formula: a new life needs a new art." (Rancière 2010:
121)
Both of these conceptions of modern art fail, for Rancière, because they fall into the trap
of metapolitics. Metapolitics is art's "way of producing its own politics, proposing to politics
rearrangements of its space, reconfiguring art as a political issue, or asserting itself as true
politics." (Rancière 2010: 119) In a certain way it designates one of the ends, that is, one of the
terminations of politics. Metapolitics refers to a conception of politics that claims that it is
ultimately capable of overcoming conflict. The conflict between life and art which brings about a
disruption of the police order is stifled and engulfed, either by life or by art. While politics is
always conflictual, metapolitics designates a state in which conflicts can be resolved. Within
politics proper, the best example of metapolitics for Rancière is Marxism. The political realm is
ultimately a realm of shadow play for the Marxist. They believe everything is decided in the
socioeconomic realm. Not only does it show where the contradiction lies, but also where it can
be resolved. While the idea of resolution seems desirable, it ultimately suffocates the possibility
of dissensus. We see this in his discussion of Marx's understanding of the duality of the
commodity. Marxist critiques of the culture industry "can be seen as the epistemological face of
Romantic poetics, the rationalization of its way of exchanging the signs of art and the signs of
life." (Rancière 2010:127)
That being said, when Rancière discusses politics as a conflictual relationship, it has
nothing to do with the rhetoric of war. The antagonism is not to be understood in a right wing
perspective that sees things in terms of enemies and friends. For a community to be political, it
must authorise "forms of subjectivation for the uncounted, for those unaccounted for." (Rancière
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2003: 198) The conflict comes into play through the retribution of the sensible that allows those
who are unaccounted for to come to the stage -- not in any sort of rhetoric around annihilation of
enemies. Once the conflict becomes antagonistic in nature, we begin to veer towards the ethical.
"The whole motto of the politics of the aesthetic regime, then, can be spelt out as follows: let us
save the 'heterogenous sensible.'" (Rancière 2010: 124) The paradoxical knot between art and life
must not be allowed to break. This is not an experience of competing interests but rather, a
delicate balance which allows for the redistribution of the sensible if and only if it is engaged in
free dissensual play
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Chapter 2- The Ethical Turn
In order to better understand the ethical turn, we must first look at how it came to be.
Rancière provides a foundation for this is a text called Who is the Subject of Rights of Man?
Politics is an activity that always involves correcting the miscount that the police order creates.
This is accomplished through bringing those that are unaccounted for within the regulative body
onto the stage. Human rights discourse often centers heavily around those that we may consider
unaccounted for -- refugees, stateless people, etc. But, Rancière claims recent thinking in the
human rights discourse had depoliticized human rights in a problematic way. The shift from
seeing right as the rights of man towards a conception of 'humanitarian' rights is emblematic of
the ethical shift for Rancière. The question of human rights came to the fore in Soviet states in
the 70's and 80's as the great communist projects began to crumble. The young Marx had been
vehemently opposed to the idea of human rights as they always already presuppose an
affirmation of the state. Critics of Marxism thought that when communism was defeated,
humanity would finally be at peace within liberal democracy and all humans would have rights.
Of course, looking at it now we can see how unrealistic that idea was. The rights of man
"appeared more and more as the rights of the victims, the rights of those who were unable to
enact any rights or even any claim in their name, so that eventually their rights had to be upheld
by others, at the cost of shattering the edifice of International Rights, in the name of a new right
to 'humanitarian interference'—which ultimately boiled down to the right to invasion." (Rancière
2004: 298) When the rights of Albanian Kosovars were ignored by the Yugoslavian state, there
was no solution that kept things within the state. What instead had to happen was a plea to
NATO to bomb Yugoslavia, and a deliberation process by NATO members to decide whether or
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not this breach of human rights deserved intervention. This was not an act of human rights, this
was an affirmation of the humanity of the victims through humanitarian interference. Marx's
original problem with human rights -- that they required recourse to a state and thus only
protected those who were part of a state -- became evident in the Balkan conflicts.
In order to account for this shift from rights of man to human rights, Rancière turns to
Hannah Arendt's account of the rights of man. In Origins of Totalitarianism, she comes to the
conclusion that, "the Rights of Man are the rights… of those who have no rights, the mere
derision of right." (Rancière 2004: 298) According to Arendt, the plight of these people does not
come from the fact that they do not have equality under a law; they are stateless people with no
law that accounts for their existence. Her idea of a "state beyond oppression" seems problematic
from the start. Most states which carried out ethnic cleansings and genocides have had codified
laws which accounted for and facilitated this oppression. As Rancière points out, her thinking
makes is seem
"as if these people were guilty of not even being able to be oppressed, not even worthy of
being oppressed. I think that we must be aware of what is at stake in this statement of a
situation and status that would be 'beyond oppression,' beyond any account in terms of
conflict and repression, or law and violence. As a matter of fact, there were people who
wanted to oppress them and laws to do this." (Rancière 2004: 299)
This step, according to Rancière, stems from a move central to Arendt's thought: the idea that
there is a rigid separation between public and private life. What ultimately hides behind this
distinction between public and private life is the relationship between the political and the social.
Arendt claimed that there had only ever been one successful revolution: the American
Revolution. This is because the American Revolution, in contrast to the French Revolution or the
Russian Revolution, was the only one that was a political revolution rather than a social
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revolution. This position, from a Marxist perspective, (which in many ways Rancière remains
loyal to particularly in this text) is deeply problematic as it does not account for the link between
the political and socioeconomic realms.
Arendt was part of a group of philosophers in the 1970's and 1980's who were concerned
with wiping out the sentiments of the anti-capitalist movements of 1968. They saw utopian
thought -- such as Marxism -- as incredibly dangerous, and turned to the Ancient Greeks as the
foundation for their political philosophy. Rancière sees Arendt as taking on somewhat of an
archipolitical position -- a type of politics he saw as originating from Plato. Rancière claims
archipolitics "reveals in all its radicality the project of a community based on the complete
realization of the arkhe of community, total awareness, replacing the democratic configuration of
politics with nothing left over. To replace this configuration with nothing left over means
offering a logical solution to the paradox of the part of those who have no part." (Rancière 1998:
65) Upon first glance, this could seem ideal -- who does not want a political community in which
everyone is involved. But for Rancière this is less about counting for the uncounted for than it is
about policing the community so that it maintains a collective accord. Archipolitics is yet another
end of politics as it envisions "'a community functioning within the regime of the Same,' one
which eliminates the part of those who have no part." (Chanter 2018: 67) We can see now how
Arendt's conception of human rights is said to have an archipolitical foundation. While she
claims the goal of her thought is to completely realize the community within politics, what ends
up occuring is the elimination of those who have no part. Her position provides:
"a frame of description and a line of argumentation that later would prove quite effective
for depoliticizing matters of power and repression and setting them in a sphere of
exceptionality that is no longer political, in an anthropological sphere of sacrality situated
beyond the reach of political dissensus." (Rancière 2004: 299)
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Instead of accounting for the rights of the oppressed through a political lens -- the oppressed
become banished to the private sphere; they themselves belong to no political community that
involves them in the political sphere. This Arendtian separation of public and private life is
something that we cling so dearly to in the United States, and we can see the unfortunate effects
of it to this day. People cannot fathom the idea of paying for universal healthcare through their
taxes, but when a member of their (social) community posts a GoFundMe along with a sad story,
people have no problem donating. We are fine with assisting others within the 'private' sphere,
but we hate the idea of public assistance.
"This overturning of an archipolitical statement into a depoliticizing approach," (Rancière
2004: 299) is a key feature of the turn towards human rights for Rancière. Giorgio Agamben's
theorization of biopolitics represents this shift strongly. He takes Arendt's understanding of the
separation between public and private, and applies Foucault's concept of biopower to it.
"In a first step, his argument relies on the Arendtian opposition of two lives, an
opposition predicated on the distinction between two Greek words: zoe, which means
'bare physiological life, and bios, which means ‘form of life,’ and notably the bios
politikos: ‘the life of great actions and noble words.’" (Rancière 2004: 300)
Zoe refers to our physical existence in the world without qualification. Bios refers to the
particularities of our lives and the rules which govern our existence. Zoe i s the root of the word
zoology, which refers to the study of animals in general, while bios i s the root word of biology,
which refers to the study of organisms which make up those animals and all other living things.
While the zoologist is concerned with the study of a zebra as a zebra, the biologist wants to
understand how it came to be a zebra and how it stays a zebra through biological functioning.
In Arendt's view, "the Rights of Man and modern democracy rested on the confusion of
those two lives—which ultimately meant the reduction of bios to sheer zoe. " (Rancière 2004:
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300) Agamben takes this idea and applies it to Foucault's concept of sexual liberation. Foucault
was wary of the wave of sexual 'liberation' that arose in the 70's, which encouraged people to
discuss and have sex more openly and freely. He saw this idea of liberation as resulting from a
power machine. This machine is described by Rancière as, "a new form of power that is no
longer the old sovereign power of Life and Death over the subjects, but a positive power of
control over biological life." (Rancière 2004: 300) Agamben argues that this allows for the
power machine to come in and enact a "positive" biopolitical program. Foucault describes the
phenomena positive power as a, "power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavours
to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive
regulations." (Foucault 1998: 137) Agamben arguably takes a somewhat problematic step in
understanding Foucault's conception of power. What Foucault describes as biopolitics and
biopower is not to be understood in a traditional sense of the word power -- that is as something
which is centralized and firmly anchored in one institution. Agamben takes the jump and
associates it with a state in order to then link it to Carl Schmitt's state of exception. The reduction
of bios to zoe in Arendt is seen as a natural step by Agamben towards a state being able to
regulate and control the biological life of its members. Arednt's original conception of the
opposition of two lives ''becomes the complicity of democracy, viewed as the mass
individualistic concern with individual life, with technologies of power holding sway over
biological life as such." (Rancière 2004: 300) The political structure of the democratic state
becomes concerned with humanity in the ontological sense rather than the epistemological sense.
The emphasis is with the status of human itself, rather than the particularities of human life.
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Consequently, a false equivocation arises between humans as a real body and humanity as an
abstract ideal.
At this point, Agamben takes another step using Schmitt's state of exception. Foucault
sees a distinct difference in the old sovereignty of political bodies and the modern phenomena of
biopower, while Agamben disagrees. Rancière describes this move:
"Schmitt had posited the state of exception as the principle of political authority. The
sovereign power is the power that decides on the state of exception in which normal
legality is suspended… Agamben identifies the state of exception with the power of
decision over life. What is correlated with the exceptionality of sovereign power is the
exception of life. " (Rancière 2004: 300)
According to Agamben, inherent in the logical structure of sovereignty is the assumption of
biopower. The sovereign power controls everything outside of the law, which means the
sovereign power controls life itself. There is no real distinction between natural humanity -humanity in the biological sense -- and constructed humanity. This is what Agamben identifies
as 'bare life.' In the same way that there is no real distinction between sovereign power and
biopower, there is no real distinction between 'absolute state power' and Rights of Man. Rancière
points out that, "the Rights of Man make natural life appear as the source and the bearer of
rights." (Rancière 2004: 300) Anyone who is familiar with popular human rights discourse can
clearly see this. The International Bill of Human Rights starts off by stating that "all human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." (IBHR, 1948) Basing human rights, a
political notion, in biological humanity can be slippery given that biological humanity is
something that scientists themselves have even struggled to define. This is why human rights
discourse can be so quick to divulge into discussions about animal rights or semantics about
what qualifies as a human. Human rights "make birth appear as the principle of sovereignty. The
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equation would still have been hidden at that time by the identification of birth—or nativity—

with nationality, that is, with the figure of the citizen." (Rancière 2004: 300) The many
humanitarian crises of the 20th century should have made this equivocation clear -- they brought
to the fore state power's relationship with bare life. Bare life, what for the state used to be "the
life of the subject that it would repress" or "the life of the enemy that it would have to kill,' is
now "a ‘sacred’ life—a life taken within a state of exception, a life ‘beyond oppression.'"
(Rancière 2004: 301) The Holocaust, according to Agamben, is a clear example of this bare life
coming out of the rights of man. "The camp is the space of the 'absolute impossibility of deciding
between fact and law, rule and application, exception and rule.'"(Rancière 2004: 301) All the
freedoms that Jewish people were given in their private lives were given by the sovereign power
that could (and did) ultimately choose to suspend those freedoms at any moment. Rancière sees
this paralyzing conclusion as ultimately stemming from Arendt's view of political action. He
claims, "that the radical suspension of politics in the exception of bare life is the ultimate
consequence of Arendt’s archipolitical position, of her attempt to preserve the political from the
contamination of private, social, apolitical life." (Rancière 2004: 301) In seeking to include all
subjects into the political sphere, she ultimately ends up depoliticizing human rights. While this
foray into Agamben may seem unnecessarily long and complicated, it serves to show how if one
is to accept Arednt's distinction between public and private, it results in a paralyzing of politics
proper.
To make sense of this ontological trap, Rancière looks at Arendt's argument about the
Rights of Man (which Agamben's argument supports). She sets up a quandary in which
"either the rights of the citizen are the rights of man—but the rights of man are the rights
of the unpoliticized person; they are the rights of those who have no rights, which
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amounts to nothing—or the rights of man are the rights of the citizen, the rights attached
to the fact of being a citizen of such or such constitutional state. " (Rancière 2004: 302)
Rancière claims this tautology is set up because it ignores the third key assumption that "the
Rights of Man are the rights of those who have not the rights that they have and have the rights
that they have not." (Rancière 2004: 302) This is, in true Rancièrean fashion, a nearly impossible
claim to understand at first sight. In order to elucidate this, let us first look at exactly why
Arendt's formula does not work. The giver of rights is not at the same time the receiver of rights
-- 'human' rights do not come from any one human, this would result in a logical tautology.
Rancière instead offers the explanation that, "the relation of the subject to his or her rights... is
enacted through a double negation. The subject of rights is the subject, or more accurately the
process of subjectivization, that bridges the interval between two forms of the existence of those
rights." (Rancière 2004:302)
This is quite an important feature in his understanding of human rights -- there is no one
form of human rights. Human rights first come in a written, codified form. This is what we see in
bills of rights. Secondly, they come in the form of people choosing to actually exercise their
rights within the world. In the first form, they end up visually representing inequality. The fact
that the U.S. has, in its Bill of Rights, a given right to vote and yet it still engages in voter
suppression brings inequality to the stage. The fact that those rights are not upheld becomes
significant in that "they are not only an abstract ideal, situated far from the givens of the
situation. They are also part of the configuration of the given." (Rancière 2004: 303) In the
second form, human rights are the rights of those who demand the realization of their rights. The
idea of humanity or citizenry is not a static thing that we are all included in. The world around us
is constantly affirming or negating our belonging in those groups, and we ourselves have the
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opportunity to enter into a dispute about our belonging. If we accept that all men are born free
and equal and deserve rights, we naturally must ask in what sphere those rights are being
affirmed? "If you answer, as Arendt does, that it is the sphere of citizenship, the sphere of
political life, separated from the sphere of private life, you sort out the problem in advance."
(Rancière 2004: 303)
But then quickly the next problem that arises is where to draw the border between public
and private life. Rancière claims that, "politics is about that border. It is the activity that brings it
back into question." (Rancière 2004: 303) The murkiness of the border was made clear by
French revolutionary Olympe De Gouges who famously claimed that, "if women are entitled to
go to the scaffold, they are entitled to go to the assembly." (Rancière 2004: 303) Women were
supposedly not part of political life at the time -- they could not vote or hold public office. But
they were still able to be reprimanded by the law if they broke laws. The border between private
and public could not so clearly be drawn because public laws also govern private life. With this
statement, Olympe de Gouges created a dissensual challenge in which she called into question
the consensual conception of what had been given by the rights discourse of the time. In this case
the oppressed were given the opportunity for a twofold demonstration in which "They could
demonstrate that they were deprived of the rights that they had, thanks to the Declaration of
Rights. And they could demonstrate, through their public action, that they had the rights that the
constitution denied to them, that they could enact those rights." (Rancière 2004: 304) This is
exactly what Rancière meant by 'those who have not the rights that they have and have the rights
that they have not.' They do not have the rights which are formally codified in some sort of bill
or law, but at the same time possess a claim to those rights they lack.
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This is a prime example of political dissensus for Rancière -- and this serves to get rid of
the tautology one falls into with Arendt's conception of human rights. "The very difference
between man and citizen is not a sign of disjunction proving that the rights are either void or
tautological. It is the opening of an interval for political subjectivization." (Rancière 2004: 304)
This understanding of rights as a dissensual process is what will serve to distinguish Rancière
from his peers who fall deep into the trap of humanism that results in ultimate victimization. We
see then that rights can be tremendously powerful for Rancière as they provide room for
dissensus. But, they can also be dangerous if the distinction is not made between forms of rights,
leading to utter victimization and dehumanization of those without the full rights of citizenship.
Rancière points out that the failure of past rights discourse, "is not only the vicious circle of a
theory; it is also the result of an effective reconfiguration of the political field, of an actual
process of [consensus]." (Rancière 2004: 306) As I previously discussed, consensus consists in
removing any contradiction, and making it appear as if the system is able to account for
anything. It attempts to close "the spaces of dissensus by plugging the intervals and patching
over the possible gaps between appearance and reality or law and fact." (Rancière 2004: 306) If
it is put into law that all humans have rights, then these rights must be identified with certain
groups and turned into fact. They cannot remain an abstract form which permits us to question
matter and vice versa. Once the freedom of speech starts to become a consensual fact in the real
world, it ceases to have any meaning. It is no longer a right of man but rather a given of our
lifestyles.
Rancière then looks at the essay written by Jean-François Lyotard on the topic of human
rights entitled The Rights of the Other. The theme of this paper can be described as this: "What
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do Human Rights mean in the context of the humanitarian situation? It is part of an attempt to
rethink rights by first rethinking Wrong. " (Rancière 2004: 307) The issue of rethinking wrong
came to the fore after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many Marxist thinkers attempted to
grapple with the crimes committed by the Soviet Union, a nation that was meant to be the
beginning of a utopia.
"The crimes of dead totalitarian regimes had to be rethought: they were said to be not so
much the specific effects of perverse ideologies and outlaw regimes as the manifestations
of an infinite wrong—a wrong that could no longer be conceptualized within the
opposition of democracy and antidemocracy, of legitimate state or lawless state, but
which appeared as an absolute evil, an unthinkable and unredeemable evil." (Rancière
2004: 307)
Rancière sees Lyotard's conception of the Inhuman as the ultimate example of this new way of
thinking. Lyotard saw the situations we view as 'inhuman' to be "the consequences of our
betrayal of another Inhuman, what we could call a ‘‘good’’ Inhuman." (Rancière 2004: 307-308)
This 'good' inhuman can be seen as many things, "the Unconscious," "the Law," "God," or "birth
and infancy," but whatever you choose to call it, it is the part of ourselves which is not in control
-- "irreducible otherness." (Rancière 2004: 308) For Lyotard, there is always something that is
untouchable and unable to be understood for human beings. This is not something he believes we
should attempt to master or quell. In fact, according to Lyotard, absolute evil comes about
precisely when humanity attempts to tame the untamable. The enlightenment promised humanity
absolute freedom and absolute rationality. The message was that everything could be conquered,
understood and controlled by humanity.
Thinkers like Lyotard had lived in Europe through the great wars and genocides of the
20th century and were, in many ways, motivated by a desire to think through those atrocities.
The notion of absolute evil was emblematic of the atrocities committed by the Third Reich for
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Lyotard. The Nazis wanted to rid the world of the religion which had an "unnamable God."
While Christianity made God human, the Jewish religion does not permit depicting God -- God
remains an entity of Otherness. This notion of unamability or lack of formalism has often been
associated with Judaism in Western thought. For Kant, Jewish Law is a prime example of what
he refers to as the sublime, a type of aesthetic judgment that occurs without recourse to form. He
argues that, "Perhaps the most sublime passage in the Jewish Law is the commandment: Thou
shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in-heaven or on
earth, or under the earth, etc." (Kant 1790: 135) Judaism becomes the ultimate religion of the
sublime. In the same way that moral law sublimates the sensibilities, Jewish Law mandates that
the religion never be represented in any sensible form. For Lytoard then, the Jewish people
become the symbol of the Other, and those who wish to tame the Other can only do so via an
extermination of the Jews. Thus, "the rights that must be held as a response to the ‘humanitarian’
lack of rights are the rights of the Other, the rights of the Inhuman." (Rancière 2004: 308) This
view ultimately paralyzes politics. Those who are uncounted for cannot be brought to the stage,
they remain associated with the unknowable and unrepresentable as the infinite Other. According
to Lyotard, human emancipation is not something to strive for; in fact, doing this ultimately
results in evil. Our only options are allowing ourselves to exist under the oppressive weight of
otherness, or attempting to completely eradicate it from the earth. "As in Agamben, this means
infinitizing the wrong, substituting for the processing of a political wrong a sort of ontological
destiny that allows only ‘resistance.’" (Rancière 2004: 308)
On a geopolitical level, this manifests in the form of humanitarian interference.
Resistance does not allow for political action -- those who suffer at the hands of 'evil' cannot
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attempt to fight for their rights. This is because if they had rights in the first place, they would
not be in such a position. Instead they must appeal to those who end up inheriting the rights they
were stripped of in order to be saved. Rancière describes this situation as a "return to sender."
(Rancière 2004: 309) The victimized groups do not get to keep the rights the benevolent (likely
Western) states so graciously gifted them, because they remain beholden to some sort of
Otherness. Instead of using them then, they must send them back in the hopes that whoever gave
them can come in and vindicate the victims. "The human rights that are sent back are now the
rights of the absolute victim. The absolute victim is the victim of an absolute evil. Therefore the
rights that come back to the sender—who is now the avenger—are akin to a power of infinite
justice against the Axis of Evil." (Rancière 2004: 309) What could be a dissensual conflict that
examined the difference between law and fact instead bleeds the two together. Those distinctions
become erased and replaced with "a sheer ethical conflict between Good and Evil." (Rancière
2004: 309)
Looking at human rights can help us understand the ethical turn within the realm of
politics proper, but the ethical turn is something that occured in art as well as politics. Working
through Rancière's critique of Lyotard's conception of an aesthetics of the sublime will help me
elucidate this concept. The aesthetics of the sublime is posited in contrast to the aesthetics of the
beautiful, which I have previously explained to be something that comes out of mutual play
between the imagination and the understanding. The sublime, on the other hand, is a feeling of
negative pleasure or respect in which we feel the superiority of our power of reason over nature.
Lyotard claims that, "'for the last century, the arts have not had the beautiful as their main
concern, but something which has to do with the sublime.'" (Rancière 2009: 88) Lyotard sees the
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aesthetics of the sublime as the route to account for the avant-garde and "bear witness to the
unrepresentable." (Rancière 2009: 89) Rancière claims Lyotard committed a category mistake
because Kant himself says, when we talk about the sublime, we no longer talk about art strictly
speaking.
"The pleasure in the sublime in nature, as a pleasure of contemplation involving subtle
reasoning, also lays claim to universal participation, yet already presupposes another
feeling, namely that of its supersensible vocation, which, no matter how obscure it might
be, has a moral foundation." (Kant 1790: 172)
This passage suggests that the supersensible is always rooted in the moral. When the moral
indirectly comes into play with aesthetic judgements, they become aesthetic judgements of the
sublime as they involve reasoning. It also is important to note that moral judgements do differ
from aesthetic judgements of the sublime for Kant. Moral judgements are made through the
concept of the good. Aesthetic judgements of all kinds do not operate under guidance by any
concept. In Kant, morality is only indirectly present in aesthetic judgements of the sublime.
There is still a constitutive difference between the good and the sublime, regardless of the fact
they are both associated with the supersensible. To equate the two would be making the same
sort of category mistakes at Rancière levels against Lyotard. It is also crucial to understand that
in a way for Kant, the limits of art are defined by the beautiful. According to Rancière, it is
impossible within the Kantian framework to identify a work of art as sublime.
This focus on the aesthetics of the sublime comes out of Lyotard's focus on the role of art
after Auschwitz. For him, the question of ethics needed to be included within the question of art
after such a catastrophic event. Lyotard implores, "'What is an art, painting or music, an art and
not a moral practice, in the context of such a disaster?'" (Rancière 2009: 90) While Lyotard asks,
what does a sublime art look like, Rancière thinks he should first be asking, is there such a thing?
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The Lyotardian sublime concerns sensuous matter itself. "Where the art of the beautiful imposes
form on matter, the art of the sublime consists in approaching matter, 'approaching presence
without means to the recourse of presentation'." (Rancière 2009: 90) This conception centers
around understanding sensuous matter as it relates to the world. Lyotard conceives of sensuous
matter's relation to the world in two ways. First, matter is pure difference which is irreducible,
"not determined by any set of conceptual differences such as timbre or nuance, the singularity of
which stands in contrast to the play of differences and determinations that govern musical
composition or the harmony of colours." (Rancière 2009: 91) Lyotard calls this material
difference immateriality. The idea of immaterial materiality itself is not a new concept -- the idea
of something which exists outside of our grasp -- but what Lyotard did with his aesthetics of the
sublime which was novel is imposed onto materiality the properties which Kant imposed on
form. In Kant, form has power to impose law onto matter while here we see matter given its own
law. What Lyotard is trying to articulate via this focus on materiality is the experience of the
sublime -- the experience of a chasm. With this first move, Lyotard echoes a position similar to
that of the modernists; he tells us the subject matter of these arts is nothing but their materiality.
This moment is then coupled further with the second characteristic of matter: the inform.
What Lyotard emphasizes by turning to the materiality of different arts is not something that
could be understood in a formalist manner, though. It has to be understood through the notion of
the inform. Rancière describes this second quality as, "it's power to make passable. It's
'immateriality' does not reside in any particular sensible quality. It resides only in what is
common to all of them: they are 'the event of a passion.'"(Rancière 2009: 92) It does not matter
the particulars of a color or note in a piece of art. All that matters is the ability of the work to
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overwhelm the mind and put it in the face of an Other. "After conferring the autonomy of form
on timbre and nuance, Lyotard confers on them the disruptive power of the inform, the discord
specific to the experience of the sublime." (Rancière 2009: 92) This separates Lyotard from a
traditional modernist understanding of modern art that is concerned primarily with form and
formal aspects (such as the one Greenberg articulates). The materiality is importantly immaterial,
though, because Lyotard removes it from traditional modernist, formalist aesthetics that you find
in Kant's notion of the beautiful and imposes the inform upon it that you find in Kant's notion of
the sublime. Lyotard turns against the Kant of the beautiful by mobilizing the Kant of the
sublime. Aesthetics judgements, then, become no longer subordinated to identifiable formal
criteria.
In the Kant of the sublime, the imagination becomes powerless to give form to the ideas
of reason and thus, the autonomy of aesthetic free play between the understanding and the
imagination is superseded by the autonomy of reason grounded in a moral foundation. Rancière
explains how Lyotard turns Kant's logic strictly on its head,"'The soul comes into existence
dependent on the sensible, thus violated, humiliated. The aesthetic condition is enslavement to
the aistheton, without which it is anesthesia.'" (Rancière 2009: 93) Just as we saw with Lyotard's
conception of the Inhuman, in this scenario the soul has two options: either it can be servile to
the senses which it cannot truly understand or be completely eradicated -- serve or die. In Kant,
the aesthetics of the sublime brings to the fore the law of the mind through the failure of the
imagination to comprehend. When we see something like Mount Everest -- something so big that
our imagination cannot grasp it -- reason steps in to explain to us how the mountain came to be.
With Lyotard the logic is again inverted: "subordination to the aistheton s ignifies subordination
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to the law of alterity… Ethical experience is that of a subordination without appeal to the law of
an Other." (Rancière 2009: 94) Lyotard is primarily interested in the experience of the sublime,
and for him, that is characteristically an experience of shock. These two moments -- the
materiality and the inform -- are what bring about that shock.
Rancière sees Lyotard as fundamentally misconstruing Kant in order to find in him
something that is simply not there: a theory of the artistic avant-garde which dissolves aesthetic
autonomy into ethical heteronomy. This is tied up in Lyotard's (and other Marxist thinkers of the
time) desire to safeguard art against the threat of commercialization. A paradoxical conjunction
is set up in Lyotard where revolution itself is to be understood as the "safeguarding artistic
novelty against form of reversion to outmoded expressions and compromises with commercial
aestheticization." (Rancière 2009: 94) The creation of new forms that occurs with the pastiche or
modernist movements had to be understood by Lyotard and his contemporaries as nothing but an
appropriation of art by capitalism, or commodification. Thus, the artistic revolution for Lyotard
was also a devolution into old forms of artistic expression. But the artistic revolution was also
crucially for Lyotard meant to preserve "a notion of art as that which testifies to the immemorial
dependency of the human mind on the unmasterable presence, that following Lacan, he calls
Thing." (Rancière 2009: 94) Here we have a conception of revolution which is both dedicated to
formalism of the past, while seeking to do away with the formalism of the present and focus art
towards this insurmountable task of bearing witness to the discord brought about via the Thing.
There is something peculiar that comes out of Lyotard's rethinking of the avant-garde.
Strictly speaking for Rancière, anything that cannot be represented belongs in the representative
regime. How then can we account for this conception of the unrepresentable within the aesthetic
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regime? This is one of the reasons this way of looking at modern art falls flat for Rancière.
Strictly speaking, there cannot be anything unrepresentable within the aesthetic regime. But
postmodernism "fulfills a desire for there to be something unrepresentable, or unavailable, so
that the practice of art can be enlisted in the necessity of the ethical detour." In this way, "the
ethics of the unrepresentable might still be an inverted form of the aesthetic promise." (Rancière
2009: 132)
In order to understand how this can be the case, Rancière turns to Lyotard's critique of
trans-avantgardism. Although it would be incorrect to call Lyotard an emblematic modernist in
the way Greenberg is, Lyotard's critique of Italian trans-avantgardism is read in a modernist
manner. Lyotard claims that, "'Mixing on the same surface neo- or hyper-realist motifs with
abstract, lyrical or conceptual motifs means that everything is equivalent because everything is
good for consumption. This is an attempt to establish and have approved a new 'taste'. This taste
is no taste.'" (Rancière 2009: 95) But this then begs the question, why is this new taste not
actually a taste for Lyotard? Rancière accuses Lyotard of giving the simplistic answer "it is not a
taste because it ought not to be." (Rancière 2009: 95) This impulse comes out of an idea popular
in Marxist aesthetic circles of the time that art and life were two spheres which had to be kept
separate. In certain ways, one finds within his discussion of the avant-garde modernist
remainders that are not dissimilar to that of Adorno. The link between them is this Marxist
account of art being art only if it is also political, and art being political only if "it produces
objects that, both in texture and the way we experience them, have a radically different status to
objects of consumption." (Rancière 2009: 96) Lyotard and Adorno both attempt to think through
a situation in which what is pleasurable is distinctly different from what is good. This is, of
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course, an attempt to think through the distinction proposed by Kant. The aesthetic judgment in
Kant is what brings about a feeling of pleasure or displeasure, while the agreeable or good is
reducible to mere sensibility. This helps them to write off the desire we get from objects of
consumption under capitalism as mere expression of the agreeable. Both Lyotard and Adorno are
focused on maintaining this distinction between the agreeable and the good. The idea is that
people desire commodities of the culture industry not because they are beautiful but because of
the desire instilled in us by the culture of capital. Thus, what is beautiful to us cannot at the same
time be agreeable, as all agreeableness is reducible to commodity fetishization. Rancière, though,
is not interested at all in keeping art pure from commodification -- he does not see anything
problematic in the notion of commodified art.
In both Adorno and Lyotard, "Art is a practice of dissensus. And it is by means of this
disensus, not by enlisting a specific cause, that artworks receive their specific qualities and get
linked to an external good." (Rancière 2009: 96) But one of the major differences between the
two is that Adorno sees the dissensus as coming out of an internal contradiction in the artwork.
Although Adorno seems to subscribe to something like a modernist conception of modern art,
there remains a sense of this paradoxical linkage between autonomy and heteronomy. For him,
art exclusively reflects upon its own materiality, but Adorno also realizes that this autonomy can
never happen to some degree. This is because there is always a heteronomy that intervenes. It is
an utter impossibility that a work of art can escape commodification -- each and every work of
art is also a commodity. The difference between what he considers advanced art and the art of
the culture industry is that advanced art reflects this impossibility in its own materiality. With
Lyotard we also see a conception of dissensus, but instead of a contradiction, it is a disaster. This
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disaster is "'original': it testifies to an alienation that no longer has anything to do with the
capitalist separation of pleasure and enjoyment, but is the simple destiny of dependency proper
to the human animal." (Rancière 2009: 96) This is how we can come to understand Lyotard's
reworking of Kant. Aesthetic pleasure must be subsumed under the ethical law of heteronomy
because allowing aesthetic autonomy also allows for the possibility of corruption through an
attempt to tame the Thing.
To understand the Lyotardian sublime even further, Rancière looks also at Schiller's
understanding of the Third Critique and how it compares to Lyotard's. In the Letters on the
Aesthetic Education of Man, Schiller understands the politics of Kant's work to be wrapped up in
the conception of aesthetic free play. In the aesthetic moment, there is no domination of the
understanding or a domination of the sensibilities, instead the two engage in a free play (which
Rancière calls dissensual) that provides mutual enrichment. This particular understanding of the
free play is crucial to why Rancière rejects a reading of Kant's aesthetics as an affirmation of the
status quo. Using this interpretation of Kant, one needs to take no recourse to the notion of the
sublime in order to account for the possibility of dissensus. The usual domination of form over
matter is immobilized in the aesthetic experience and consensus is challenged. The aesthetic
experience, for Schiller, allows for both an attraction and a repulsion. The Juno Ludovisi is able
to carry out such a task "because it manifests that character of divinity which is also… that of
humanity in its fullness: she does not work, she plays. She neither yields nor resists." (Rancière
2009: 98) The common sense achieved from the aesthetic experience is distinct from the
consensus of the political experience. It allows for universality that does not need to sacrifice
equality. Schiller's aesthetics also allows for the possibility of falling into a metapolitics of its
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own "which, against the upheavals of state forms, proposes a revolution of the forms of the lived
sensory world."1 (Rancière 2009: 99) Schiller ends up taking a metapolitical position because if
what Schiller is suggesting is true -- that one is capable of reconceiving the relationship between
form and content -- this would bring about a reconciliation that would dissolve the paradoxical
conjunction between art and life. A rejection of the Schillerian understanding of the beautiful can
also ultimately lead towards a metapolitical conception of art. For Ranciere, the need to take
recourse to the sublime is unnecessary because the experience of the beautiful in Kant (and
expanded upon by Schiller) is already able to accomplish what those defenders of the sublime
ascribe to the sublime. The experience of contradictions is operative in the experience of the
beautiful. For both Adorno and Lyotard, this dissensual relationship between form and matter is
something that they can only conceive in terms of the sublime. But, they conceive of this
dissensual relationship in different ways that represent for Rancière two different metapolitical
understanding of aesthetics, namely modernist2 in Adorno and postmodernist3/ethical in Lyotard.
The double movement of attraction and repulsion that one finds in Schiller is imposed
upon the sublime. Adorno employs this line of thinking in the service of rejecting a conception
of a division of labour that keeps commodity and culture separate. "The path towards
emancipation is the one that exacerbates the separation, that... reaffirms the good of dissensus by
rejecting all forms of reconciliation between the beautiful and pleasure." (Rancière 2009: 103) In
Lyotard, we see a focus on this irreconcilability as the both the ultimate goal and the end of
aesthetics. Art no longer has the role of critiquing society as it did in Adorno, rather its function

What Ranciere is discussing here is an avant-garde metapolitics.
Adorno is not entirely a modernist thinker. He is a modernist in that his conception of art rests upon the material,
but his understanding of material is also quite complex because he has a dialectical understanding of material.
3
Although Ranciere sees Lyotard as emblematic of postmodern art, his charge against Lyotard may not be entirely
well-founded. In The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard is actually very critical of certain features of postmodernism.
1
2
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is testifying to the otherness of the Other. And for Rancière, the ultimate goal of Lyotard is tied
up in his desire to connect aesthetics to yet another 'grand narrative.' Marxist thought attempted
to bring everything back to capital. Everything could (and had to be) explained at the level of the
economy in Marxism. Lyotard extricated aesthetics from that yoke only to place it under a new
yoke, that of the Other/Thing/Inhuman. He sets up a new metapolitical scenario in which "the
West's modern history is identified not with the emancipation of the proletariat but with the
programmed extermination of the Jews." (Rancière 2009: 103) The avant-garde conception of art
is important to Lyotard in that it maintains the line between art and products of the culture
industry, but in a way he divulges from typical avant-garde conceptions of art. The autonomy of
art is no longer tied up in "the game of a contradiction; it is the inscription of a shock. The shock
is still an alienation of sorts but it is an insurmountable one." (Rancière 2009: 103) And where
Schiller's formula once promised freedom out of the aesthetic experience, Lyotard demands
infinite servility to the Other. For Rancière, what Lyotard seems to completely neglect is this
moment that was so important to the different avant-garde moments -- the move meant to close
the gap between art and life. The understanding of these different movements (i.e. Dadaism,
Surrealism, Cubism, Constructivism, etc) was that the transformation of the meaning of art was
at the same time a transformation of the meaning of life. Within Rancière's own framework,
then, these different avant-garde movements could be seen as success of Schiller, and this is a
moment that is ignored by Lyotard.
Rancière had set up his conception of the ethical turn throughout his texts on human
rights and the aesthetics of the sublime, but in his last chapter of Aesthetics and its Discontents,
Rancière lays out a clear argument for why he believes both aesthetics and politics have taken an
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ethical turn. In the modern age, ethics is commonly thought to be a system that analyzes the
validity and the consequences of human actions with regard to their effect on collective
wellbeing. Rancière considers this to be a misnomer -- the above system is actually one of
morality. Ethics is an entirely different act -- it is first and foremost "the identification of all
forms of discourse and practice under the same indistinct point of view." (Rancière 2009: 110)
This point of view becomes a law for every decision and human action that takes place within
the ethical regime. Not only that, but the very existence of everything within the world and the
ordering of the world is always subject to the ultimate law. "The growing indistinction between
fact and law" ushers in a new period in which what used to be the binary of right and wrong now
becomes an ultimatum between good and evil. Fact -- what is -- is no longer able to be separated
from law -- what ought to be. All these distinctions become distilled into the notion of terror or
trauma. The ethical turn comes from a conjunction of two ways of understanding the Greek word
ethos: "both the dwelling and the way of being, the way of life corresponding to this dwelling.
Ethics, then, is a kind of thinking which establishes the identity between an environment, a way
of being, and a principle of action.’’ (Rancière 2009: 110)
This new ethical regime of art came about partly through an attempt by 20th century
thinkers to understand Auschwitz. Western civilization as a whole had never experienced
anything like Auschwitz and, as such, had no way to understand Auschwitz. While in the past, an
act carried out by a political apparatus in the name of betterment of a state would have been
judged through the lens of historical precedent or political necessity, Auschwitz was
incomprehensible. The question of why Auschwitz had been carried out was above all else, an
ethical question. What the Third Reich had carried out was not wrong -- it was pure evil. This
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positing of a new, radical Other paralyzes any and all thoughts following it. It was paradoxically
so horrible that it could never truly be comprehended, and at the same time also so horrible that it
demanded every thought to be dedicated to comprehending it. It sets up something that can never
be dissected, understood, or even so much as touched. The only way forward is annihilation of
this radical evil or standing transfixed in front of it.
But, this ethical turn was not something that happened directly in response to just
Auschwitz. Another crucial feature of it is that it goes hand in hand with the rejection of the
achievements of the great utopias of 1968. After the Fascists were defeated in World War II,
there was hope that the ideas of Marx would be the way forward in the new world. But then
communist leaders came in like Mao and Stalin who were carrying out atrocities just as
egregious as the Fascists who had come before them. There was a focus among thinkers to
understand why the project of Marxism had been realized so poorly in places like the USSR.
Some theorists of the time -- such as Hannah Arendt -- argued that Marxism and Nazism were
both different types of totalitarianism, while others -- such as the Frankfurt School -- argued
Marxism merely needed to be rethought. Then in '68 people around the world began to rise up
against imperialism, capitalism, racism, sexism, etc. The ethical turn was a direct response to
these movements. It is tied up in this notion that the 20th century was nothing but an experience
of totalitarianism on the right and on the left, and that the left vestiges of this quasi-totalitarian
thought could be found in '68. The ethical turn functioned to depoliticize politics and stifle this
revolutionary spirit. It tells us that systems of oppression which are fundamentally tied to
capitalism can coexist with capitalism. We are told: 'you can have capitalist anti-racism,
capitalist feminism, capitalist anti-imperialism, etc.' This is problematic within Rancière's
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framework because "Politics, as the opposite of the police, is a form of dissensus that
polemically confirms the axiom of equality—the only political axiom for him." (Guénoun 2009:
177) The ethical turn ultimately functions to depoliticize everything that it touches, therefore the
idea that you can fight for any sort of equality without politics is entirely contradictory.
Within the new ethical regime, Rancière explains both politics and art's subjection to the
turning of fact into law. While art may feel more political than it ever has been, ethics have
actually paralyzed the politics of aesthetics. Politics for Rancière is "not, as is often said, the
opposite of morals. It is its division." (Rancière 2009: 111) This ethical turn does not necessarily
mean a return to the ethical regime of art; the ethical turn exists independently of the three
regimes. It does share characteristics with the ethical regime in that it measures the worth of art
through its political worth. In the ethical regime of images, artistic images are held up to "the
standard that philosophy provides" (Chanter 2018: 84) while the ethical turn of aesthetics
measures art against the unattainable standard of the Other. In both cases, though, the artwork is
always already deficient in the eyes of the rule imposed on it by the dominant political order.
This has the effect of separating art entirely from the political, ultimately leading it down a path
to nowhere. It also shares features with the representative regime in that it is concerned with
regulating what is and what is not representable. This comes out of the unthinkability Lyotard
associates with the Holocaust. For Rancière:
"to claim that it is a trauma beyond all traumas that requires a language unique to its
unspeakability is problematic both because it privileges this one event over others, as if
by definition it is more unthinkable than other traumas, and because it runs counter to a
defining feature of the aesthetic regime, in which there is nothing that is
unrepresentable." (Chanter 2018: 91)
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It is important to note that the regimes Rancière discusses are not necessarily ordered in a
teleological sense -- the features of all of them can manifest in different ways at the same time.
This is how we can have a manifestation of all three regimes of images within the ethical turn:
the Platonic regime in its depoliticizing nature, the representative in its unrepresentability, and
the aesthetic in the formalism we see through its subreption of the ethical event. With the ethical
turn, we see that ethics comes to take on a new meaning from the original Greek term-- it is "a
new and specific interpretive schema governed entirely by one event—Auschwitz —emblematic
of totalitarian catastrophe and by a single law— ‘‘the new law of Moses’’—which is a
Janus-faced dictum facing, on one side, Moses (a name that has come to symbolize Jewish
ethics) and on the other McDonald’s (a name which has come to symbolize international
capitalism)." (Guénoun 2009: 179) This new sense of ethics implies a constant sublimation of the
self to the Other, in which there is no aesthetic separation from reason.
Politics is a matter of making visible and bringing new things to the stage of sensorium
-- and for Rancière this is only carried out through the conflict of dissensus. The ethical turn
functions to stifle that conflict and confuse law and fact; there is a double-subreption in which
the ethical event is concealed by the work of art, and the work of art is concealed by the ethical
event. In this case, we either must submit "to the law of the Other that does us violence, or
indulgence in the law of the self that leads us into an enslavement by commercial culture."
(Rancière 2009: 105) In the wake of Auschwitz, the law of Moses is being used by Rancière in
the sense of submitting to the law of the Other, and the law of McDonald's in the sense of
submitting yourself to a culture of capital, both which makes freedom impossible. One can either
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be a victim of the system or participate in the system, and the only alternative to these choices
are to destroy the system entirely.
Rancière then turns to Lars Von Trier's Dogville to elucidate exactly what this ethical
turn looks like in art. It is loosely based off of Bertold Brecht's Saint Joan of The Stockyards, in
which Joan of Arc becomes Joan Dark and is transposed into Depression-era Chicago. Joan Dark
starts off as a member of a Christian Salvation Army-esque organization who is trying to bring
Christian morality into the ultra-capitalist chaos around her. In an attempt to reach the poor
slaughterhouse workers with her message, she confronts the slaughterhouse owner. When she
does this, he lets her come see the factory for herself. While there, she sacrifices herself for one
the workers and soon realizes her Christian morality and the organization which she put her faith
into is impotent in fighting the violence of capitalism. She dies disillusioned with her old
organization, yet nonetheless a martyr.
In Dogville, we are told the story of Grace, who stumbles into a tiny mining town in
Colorado while on the run for her life. The townspeople are at first wary of Grace, so Tom, the
spiritual leader of the town who first encouraged Grace to stay, suggests Grace earns their
approval by doing chores for them. After she does them, the townspeople agree to let her stay for
two weeks and decide at the end what to do with her. Grace continues to do her chores, which
she even earns a little bit of money for, and at the end of this period the town agrees to let her
stay. Soon, the town realizes Grace is on the run from the law for a bank robbery and Tom
suggests Grace do even more chores for even less pay. At this point she seems to be slightly
uncomfortable with the idea but obliges. Over time Grace is abused and exploited by the
townspeople, and when she tries to escape they violentently punish her.
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The way Von Trier chose to transform the story of Saint Joan was in a ethicizing way. In
the original Brechtian fable we are first shown two groups that seem to be at odds with each
other: the Christians and the Capitalists. But over time we come to realize that the 'good' side is
not so good at all. Joan's faith in the Straw Hats is then "transformed into a militant morality,
which took as its criterion the necessities of the struggle against oppression." (Rancière 2009:
110-111) There was no one morality, we are shown both Christian morality and the militant
morality that Joan eventually adapts. Good or evil is not readily identified because 'good' or
'right' is also identified on the side which stands in opposition to the rights of the oppressed.
Most importantly those that were previously unaccounted for -- the slaughterhouse workers -- are
both literally and figuratively brought to the stage. For Rancière, Saint Joan is a perfect example
of politics. "The opposition of two types of violence was therefore also that between two sorts of
morals and of rights. This dividing of violence, morality, and right has a name. It is called
politics. Politics is not, as is often said, the opposite of morals. It is its dividing." (Rancière 2009:
111)
Von Trier then takes this idea and corrodes it by transposing it into the world of Dogville
without the Brechtian split. In Dogville we are given a character who has no purpose other than
trying to be accepted. There is no counting for the unnaccounted or uncovering the truth behind
her motivations. Von Trier distills that all down and gives us a character who is good, and others
who are evil. Grace is amenable and easy to root for like our original heroine, but she is not
meant to help us understand the complexities of the violence around her. She is exploited and
abused by the townspeople for reasons that cannot be comprehended -- the evil encountered by
Grace in Dogville "refers to no other cause but itself." (Rancière 2009: 111) We find out that
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Grace's father was the head of the mobsters that she was running from, and watch her decide
Dogville must be punished for their crimes. She ordered the mobsters to kill every living being in
Dogville, save the dog named Moses, and burn it to the ground. The evil of the community was
so infinite that it could not be accounted for and understood -- the only possible answer was to
destroy it. And, of course, it is not Grace herself which brings it to its heel, the evil is only able
to be addressed by her father, who convinces her Dogville cannot be forgiven. "The Brechtian
lesson was: 'Only violence helps where violence reigns'. The transformed formula appropriate to
our consensual and humanitarian times is 'Only evil repays evil.'" (Rancière 2009: 111) Von
Trier was heavily critiqued for the film by the jury at Cannes for its lack of humanism, and
Rancière argues that the lack of humanism in it comes precisely from its positing of infinite
justice. It tells us that we can take justice into our own hands wherever injustice befalls us.
Another prime example of this infinite justice for Rancière is Clint Eastwood's film
Mystic River. In Mystic River J immy executes his former friend Dave because he believes Dave
to be the perpetrator behing the murder of his daughter. Jimmy has gotten away with the murder
because his friend and accomplice Sean in the police force helped Jimmy cover it up. Sean
helped Jimmy cover it up because when they were both boys, they were responsible for Dave
being kidnapped and raped. They feel that they are responsible for the trauma that Dave endured,
and see it as their fault that he has become the type of man one would suspect of murdering a
young girl. In past cinematographic tales of the falsely accused, truth is that which ultimately
rights the wrongs originally posed. "Today, evil, with its innocent and guilty parties, has been
turned into the trauma which knows of either innocence or guilt, which lines in the zone of
indistinction between guilt and innocence, between psychic disturbance and social unrest."
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(Rancière 2009: 112) Evil can again not be understood in this scenario. Jimmy kills Dave in
response to the trauma of losing his daughter, and soon we find out Dave was victim to this
because of the trauma which has befallen him. At that point, we can also assume that those
perpetrators were also themselves victims of trauma, because of course evil repays evil. The
original source of evil is not of concern -- all that the film serves to do is give witness to the
profound trauma which everyone involved endures. "Not only is a scenario of disturbance and
sickness used to replace one of justice. The sickness itself has changed meaning… Childhood
trauma has become the trauma of being born, the simple misfortune that befalls every human
being for being an animal born too early." (Rancière 2009: 112) The punishment that occurs is
no longer about justice, because there is no right and wrong to be found anymore, instead
violence is seen as a necessary and reasonable response to trauma.
Where there is trauma in art and psychoanalysis, there is terror in politics. Terror is "a
trauma elevated to the status of a civilizational phenomenon." (Rancière 2009: 114) George
H.W. Bush's never ending 'War on Terror' is emblematic of this doling out of infinite justice. The
lives lost on September 11th, 2001 are no longer what matters to people -- the physical
destruction caused that day has been dwarfed exponentially by the damage the United States let
loose in the Middle East. In the preface of his book, The Great War of Our Time, former CIA
director Michael Morrell and Bush advisor describes what compelled him to write his book: "I
wanted to tell the remarkable story of CIA's fight against the group that killed nearly three
thousand people on that beautiful sunny morning in September 2001." (Morell 2015: xiii) I will
not bore you with the details, but needless to say the events Morell goes on to describe in his
book (mixed in with anecdotes from his otherwise comfortable life in Northern Virginia) took
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the lives of many more than three thousand people. For these people, the interest is not avenging
some wrong or doling out any justice. It is about keeping the threat of terror constantly at bay
through a never ending campaign of violence. In the past, a general would at least fight with his
soldiers -- war was about settling some score ,and those who had stakes in the matter came out to
fight. Now, the commanding officers have no interest in the fight itself. They sit at their desks in
Washington D.C. and send people off to die in hopes of keeping this neverending terror at bay.
Morell himself makes this evidently clear when he explains another reason he chose to
write his book is that "most importantly… the threat of terrorism has not gone away. It did not
die in Abbottabad along with Bin Laden. It is going to be with us for decades to come, and as a
nation we must be prepared. If we are not, we will, with certainty, face another devastating attack
on our homeland." (Morell 2015: xiv) The terminology here is all chosen to make us feel as
though we are constantly at risk of being attacked. It was written to make it clear that even
though 9/11 is over and the U.S. has killed the person most responsible for it, it is not finished
being avenged -- and it will likely not be done being avenged for an undisclosed period of time.
"The logic of this form of justice is to stop only once the terror itself has stopped, but this is a
terror which by definition never stops for beings who must endure the trauma of birth."
(Rancière 2009: 114) To be alive in the 21st century is to constantly be at risk of attack -- evil is
acceptable because evil is assumed to be hiding in the shadows at any given moment, and evil
can be the only thing which repays evil. Justice is everywhere and nowhere because we must all
be on the offensive at all times, ready for the next 'devastating attack on our homeland,' self, or
way of being. The facts of what happened that day on 9/11 become distilled into the law of
infinite justice.
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The ethical turn is not about injecting morality into our political and cultural machines, it
is actually about getting rid of any traces of it. For Rancière, morality implies "the division of
different forms of morality and of rights, the division between ways of opposing right to fact."
(Rancière 2009: 115) To look at the 9/11 attacks through the lens of morality, one would have to
look at the facts and understand the damage done to the Middle East through colonialism, the
redrawing of borders during the Paris Peace Conference, CIA intervention in the region, US
occupation in Saudi Arabia at the time, etc. Three thousand people were killed that day, and that
is undoubtedly a wrong -- but the conditions leading up to the decision to carry out that attack
cannot be wiped from the record. This lack of morality is what Rancière has referred to as
consensus.
This shift in the psychoanalytic understanding of trauma in art can be encapsulated by the
Greek tragedy, Antigone, according to Rancière. Psychoanalytic art used to be centered around
an Oedipal notion -- that "trauma amounted to a forgotten event that could be cured when trauma
was reactivated." (Rancière 2009: 113) But now, there has been a shift in thinking towards moral
humanism. Bonnie Honig describes this in her book Antigone Interrupted: "This humanism
asserts that what is common to humans is not rationality but the ontological fact of mortality, not
the capacity to reason but vulnerability to suffering." (Honig 2013:17) Antigone has replaced
Oedipus in psychoanalytic theorization and in turn, trauma has become something central to the
human condition rather than a condition with a rational cause. Rancière describes this below:
"There is neither beginning nor end to the trauma encapsulated in Antigone. The tragedy
bespeaks the discontent of a civilization in which the laws of a social order are
undermined by the very things that support them: the powers of filiation, earth and night.
Antigone, said Lacan, is not the heroine of the human rights created by modern
democratic piety. Instead, she is the terrorist, the witness of the secret terror that underlies
the social order." (Rancière 2009: 113-114)
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The story of Antigone starts with suffering. Her two brothers have just finished fighting opposite
sides of a civil war, and one of them has died. Creon, the new ruler of Thebes, decrees her
brother will not be allowed a proper burial. Antigone disobeys Creon's wishes and gives her
brother the proper burial. Antigone is often thought to represent the laws of the home while
Creon represents the laws of the land. When she is caught doing this she does not deny it, and
Creon puts her to death by way of leaving her to die in a cave. Antigone expresses regret over
her decisions and hangs herself, dying seemingly for the cause of nothing. Part of the beauty of
tragedy is that even though the characters must die, it is always in the purpose of some greater
good. Their universal principles live on with them. Antigone, though, has no purpose other than
to suffer. "Antigone represents grief for ungrievable life or solitary conscience rising up against
arrogant power," (Honig 2013: 18) She is the victim who never had any real shot at being saved.
Even if her and Creon were meant to be two different poles of morality, she never stands a
chance in the face of the power that the law gives Creon. Her only power lies in her suffering's
ability to bear witness to the evil of the law. She represents the fact which becomes subsumed
under law within the ethical turn.
On the other hand, there is a recent tradition of reading Antigone as a revolutionary
figure. Both Slavoj Žižek and Judith Butler discuss her in this context. Butler thinks Antigone
has been misunderstood by many as being apolitical due to the reading Hegel gives, which
confines "Antigone to the sphere of kinship and family, leaving politics to Creon." (De Sanctis
2012: 27) Hegel sees Antigone as emblematic of family values; standing in opposition to the
state. Butler thinks this interpretation misses the point because, "there cannot really be kinship
without the mediation and support of the state and vice versa." (De Sanctis 2012: 28) The state
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and society are posited as a binary, while Butler believes that in reality they are inherently linked
to each other. Furthermore, Antigone's complicated relationship with her family is an even
stronger suggestion that this Hegelian binary does not hold. Butler argues this is clear through
the fact the Antigone is both a child of incest and displays incestual tendencies.
"Antigone, therefore, ‘represents not kinship in its ideal form but its deformation and
displacement’ (Butler 2000: 24). Not only is she Oedipus’s daughter and sister, not only
is she cold and rather hostile towards the other members of her family, her exclusive
affection for her brother Polyneices also seems to be more than sisterly love. (De Sanctis
2012: 28)
In Butler's reading, Antigone is not the representative of the law of the home, but rather a
subversive critique of it to some degree. She is not defying Creon for an upholding of morality,
but rather motivated by her own taboo desires which subvert the laws of the home.
Butler then goes on to critique Lacan's understanding of Antigone as emblematic of the
ethics of desire. Lacan does not see her as upholding the laws of the family, but rather considers
her as a figure that is driven entirely by desire. In this interpretation, she is not a self-aware
political figure at all, and is motivated by her subconscious feelings for Polyneices. Lacan then
falls into the same binary as Hegel because he removes Antigone from the political and
associates her with the unconscionable Other. Butler, on the other hand, claims that "the structure
of kinship, the Law of the Father that prohibits incest – which for Lacan is the basis of the
symbolic and thus the very possibility of the social, since the mother stands for the forever lost
object of desire – is exactly what Antigone challenges." (De Sanctis 2012: 29) She champions
Antigone for choosing her brother over her husband because it challenges the heterosexual
marriage structures which Butler views as oppressive. Butler champions Antigone both as a
victim par excellence of the laws of heterosexual marriage, and a political hero for having the
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strength to challenge those laws. Lacan sees her as an ethical figure who exists entirely outside
of the political -- very much reading her in line with a symbol of the ethical turn. Butler reads
Antigone as a much more dissensual figure, and presents her desire as political and social. She
sees Antigone as working within the confines of the law to point out the shortcomings of the law.
Žižek agrees with Butler's rejection of Antigone as emblematic of the home, but does not
think this is the case because of her incestual relationships. He agrees with Butler's claim that
Antigone is rejecting motherhood, but thinks her coldness towards her sister Ismene is even more
important. "Whereas Ismene is the friendly neighbour, or, in Lacanian terms, our semblable,
Antigone perfectly embodies the scary Other we cannot understand: she is what Lacan calls ‘das
Ding’, the Thing." (De Sanctis 2012: 31) While Ismene represents the friendly other, Antigone is
entirely emblematic of the law of the inhuman Other for Žižek. This happens because Antigone
has stepped outside of the social order which makes the Other intelligible to us. Antigone is
'between two deaths' because she is still physically alive for most of the play, yet symbolically
dead as she has chosen to step outside of the social order and exists in the domain of the inhuman
Other. This domain is what Lacan calls 'Ate,' meaning 'ruin, reckless impulse, madness, fixation.'
Žižek claims that "the domain of Ate is unbearable for more than a little time. This is why
Antigone goes through her second (physical) death. The only other option would be to step back
into the symbolic order, but this is something Antigone would never do." (De Sanctis 2012: 32)
For this reason, she becomes the ultimate ethical figure.
Žižek does not see Antigone as this ethical figure because she opposes Creon in the
typical clash between state and society, she rather makes herself inhuman by rejecting the
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symbolic order. This is ultimately tied to a death drive, for Žižek, because she cannot physically
exist in the world for much longer after she has symbolically annihilated herself.
"She is a revolutionary figure, because she acts. It is opportune to introduce here Žižek’s
conception of ‘Act’ as opposed to ‘action’. The latter is an ordinary accomplishment,
something we do that has no particular relevance to our lives. An Act, on the other hand,
is something that makes us subjects… To become a subject, to act, she has to exit the
symbolic order and, by means of this transgression, enter the domain of Ate." (De Sanctis
2012: 32)
In order to act, according to Žižek, we must first allow ourselves to be imposed upon by the Law.
Butler sees Antigone's repetition of the Law as proof that she is challenging the symbolic from
within, whereas Žižek is as her accepting her objectivity in the face of the Other and submitting
herself to the domain of Ate. "The Lacanian symbolic order becomes, in Žižek, one thing with
the social. Thus, Antigone’s Act rises above the sphere of kinship (Hegel) and that of language
(Lacan in Butler’s reading) and regains its political value." (De Sanctis 2012: 33) This is
because, by becoming the Thing, Antigone is acting and therefore challenging the existing social
order. This act, for Žižek, is the only way to challenge the social order. In order for a rupture,
there is a necessary violence that takes place in the form of the Act. In this framework then, both
the creation and the preservation of the law requires violence. Both thinkers would agree that
Antigone's revolutionary power comes about in the way she opposes the Law, showing that
where there is Law there must also be exception.
Antigone is the perfect protagonist for the ethical turn because, as a woman, she poses as
the perfect candidate for the absolute victim. Although she is often associated with the law of the
home, she arguably more broadly represents the law of the Other or the law of Moses. Creon, on
the other hand, represents the law of the Order or the law of McDonald's, and ultimately her law
never stands a chance in the face of his. I believe Antigone not only to be significant for her role
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within the broader ethical turn, but also her application to the new binary I will lay out in the
next chapter: the law of the Gaze and the law of the Victim. Antigone, as one of history's most
well known women who suffered, exists as the figurehead of female suffering for many centuries
to come. While female victimhood is hardly a novel topic, I will argue the Me Too movement
has further ethicized victimhood in way that depoliticizes feminist politics and art, and has led to
the imposition of an unknowable trauma on sexuality.
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Chapter 3- Feminism in Consensual Times
Rancière's ethical turn has been of particular interest to me because I believe it to be a
driving force behind the deradicalization of feminism that has characterized the 21st century.
Feminism is typically divided into 'waves' characterized by different focuses. The wave
analogies can be somewhat oversimplying -- the feminist thought coming out of all these eras
were more diverse than I can do justice to -- but looking at feminst thought through the wave
narratives will help us better understand how it developed alongside the ethical turn occurring in
the overall political and cultural spheres. The first-wave of feminism was focused on gaining the
status of personhood for women and securing the right to vote. This wave was led mostly by
white Suffragettes such as Mary Wollstoncroft and Elizabeth Cady Stanton. The second-wave of
feminism arose in the 1960's. This era, by far, produced the most radical thought, and was far
more intersectional than its predecessor. In fact, this is when the concept of intersectionality was
first verbalized. Materially, this focused on securing women social equality as well as political
equality. In this wave, one can find the strongest concentration of Marxist, queer,
anti-imperialist, and anti-racist thought presented in conjuction with feminism. Some of the most
notable thinkers of this era include Simone De Beauvoir, Angela Davis, and Catherine
Mackinnon. While there is no doubt that the second-wave feminist movement had its problems
(particularly with the lack of intersectionality that characterized some of the thought coming
from white women), it continues to be the period that disrupted the police order of gender in the
most radical way.
Feminism, as did all other political movements, felt the ethical turn in response to these
revolutionary politics we saw crystallized in 1968. The new feminism that came out in response
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to the second-wave attempted to strip it of all its radical features and marry it with the neoliberal
consensual order in a palatable way. It seems much harder to actually define what thought came
out of this era -- and that is arguably because there was not as much dissensual thought being
formulated at the time. It seemed to manifest much more in the professional realm -- this is the
era in which women were encouraged to break the glass ceiling. Gender scholar Angela
McRobbie takes the step of arguing that we should not even look at this period as the
'third-wave,' rather she sees it as a movement towards post-feminism. She characterizes it as a
time in "which feminist gains of the 1970s and 1980s are actively and relentlessly undermined."
(McRobbie 2008: 11) There tends to be a lot of disagreement around when the third-wave ends
and the fourth-wave begins, but for the same reasons as McRobbie I would argue that it does not
really matter. The ethical turn actually depoliticized feminism to the extent that there is no real
ideological difference between the two. What is called 'the fourth-wave' was just a popularization
of third-wave ideas within mainstream culture. The people who moved forth new feminism were
less theoreticians or political activists than they were corporatists. Sociologist Catherine
Rottenberg argues that the most important text of this period was Sheryl Sandberg's Lean In, a
book written by the former COO of Facebook about how women can have both career and
family success (Rottenberg 2013: 418). Unlike their predecessors, the 'thinkers' of this era offer
little immanent critique of the system itself. Their main focus is how to achieve personal success
while working within existing consensual structures.
The dissensual discourse that occured within the second-wave was largely neutralized.
Women, the group that once made up a political community was transformed into an ethical
community. Rancière defines a political community as "a community that is structurally divided,
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not between divergent interest groups and opinions, but divided in relation to itself." (Rancière
2009: 114) Within a political community, one can find different forms of morality and different
approaches to opposing right to fact. Oppression is not about an evil trying to tame the
untamable, it is about understanding how codified rights match up to political realities. Rancière
describes exactly what this consensus looks like:
"The classical form of political conflict opposes several 'peoples' in one: the people
inscribed in the existing forms of the law and the constitution; the people embodied in the
state; the ones ignored by this law or whose right the State does not recognize; and the
one that makes its claims in the name of another right that is yet to be inscribed in facts.
Consensus is the reduction of these various 'peoples' into a single people identical with
the count of a population and it's parts, of the interests of a global population and it's
parts." (Rancière 2009: 115)
We can use the example of the second-wave feminists to illustrate what this may look like in
actuality. Feminist scholar bell hooks critques the first-wave and examines the ways in which it
miscounted the experiences of all women. She discusses the failings of the suffrage movements
and the white feminists that came after them. Although some white Suffragettes objected, the
19th amendment technically gave all women including women of color the right to vote. If one
were to assume fact and right to be the same, then one could pronounce this particular struggle to
be over. Women of all races had the same constitutional rights of men of all races, thus we could
declare America a free and equal nation. hooks points out the flaws in this. She discusses how,
although women were supposedly equal, "While white women were rejoicing over obtaining
their right to vote, a system of racial apartheid was being institutionalized throughout the U.S.
that would threaten the freedom of black women far more crucially than sexual imperialism"
(hooks 1981: 172) She explains the voter suppression that separates fact and law in the era of the
first-wave. Quoting June Sochen, she points out how, "'when black women went to the polls in
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Alabama or Georgia, they found that white election officials had a bag of tricks ready to prevent
them from voting.'" (hooks 1981: 172) A truly dissensual analysis of the suffragette movements
would also be incomplete without a class analysis. The feminists of the first-wave were mostly
upper-class women who did not understand the burden of class oppression. Many poor women of
all races became disillusioned with first-wave feminism because "even though the [National
Women's Party] pledged to work for full equality for women, it actively worked to promote
solely the interests of white middle and upper class women." (hooks 1981: 172)
The way the 19th amendment had been realized did not in fact reward black women and
poor women with the same rights as rich white women, because Jim Crow racism and American
capitalism was preventing those rights from being actualized properly. hooks aims to point out
how the feminist morality of the first-wave had been ineffective in actualizing the rights of all
women. It needed to be transformed into a more militant morality that fought against the ways
black and poor women's legal rights did not match up to their actualization within the state and
also demanded a new right to equal treatment (rather than separate but equal treatment). In this
example, we see both how a legal right is bestowed upon some and not recognized in others, and
we see the demand for a new right that has not yet been inscribed. She takes a dissensual
approach to feminism by bringing to the stage the structural differences present in the political
community; pointing out that "in a capitalist, racist, imperialist state there is no one social status
women share as a collective group." (hooks 1981: 136) This is not to say that a racial critique of
feminism is in itself already subversive. Identity politics can be very consensual, especially if it
deemphasizes the question of capital. hooks is clear to state that "resolution of the conflict
between black and white women cannot begin until all women acknowledge that a feminist
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movement which is both classist and racist is a mere sham." (hooks 1981: 157) What is
dissensual about hooks' approach here is the way in which she critiques the generalization of the
concept of woman, and points out how fact and law did not match up. When contextualizing the
failures of the first-wave, hooks accounts for all systems of oppression, not just gender
oppression, in order to bring to the stage those that have not been counted for. Through
dissensual approaches we can work towards equality by ascribing new rights and recognizing the
ways the current ones are not being actualized properly.
Consensus reduces these groups into one. "It incessantly works to fill in all these intervals
between right and fact through which the right and the people are divided. The political
community thus tends to be transformed into an ethical c ommunity, into a community that
gathers together a single people in which everyone is supposed to be counted." (Rancière 2009:
115) Consensual feminism is that feminism which attempts to argue there exists some sort of
collective status as Woman, ignoring the many differences in which the rights of different
women manifest into fact. One phenomena of consensual feminism is that of 'representation.'
This is not representation in the Rancièrian sense. It also is not about bringing people to the stage
who were previously uncounted -- this is the guise of representational feminism, but it is not
particularly interested in doing so.
One of the things commonly considered to be an important part of the third-wave of
feminism was the election of 27 women to the United States Congress in 1992 -- it was called
"The Year of the Woman." Women were told to be happy about this because finally they were
being given positions of power, but one could ask, what kind of woman? What is meant by "the
Woman" and why is it just her year rather than the year of the women, plural? In this case "the
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Woman" is the woman who fits neatly into the American imperial state; she is the woman who
plays by the man's rules in order to gain the same power as the man. Sure, one could argue her
quest for power is somewhat dissensual. Her being elected to Congress makes clear the
difference in how women's and men's legal rights to office were being recognized at the time.
But her actions, as dissensual as they have the potential to be within the traditional gender
binary, lose all their revolutionary potential when they turn women into "the Woman." Why
should the election of those 27 women be a triumph for all women? Are women just a monolith
group that win together and lose together? Of course, we know that this in not the case -- some
women have much easier lives than others. But the ethical turn takes women, the political
community, and files them all under "the Woman," the ethical community. Those who are
excluded from the community either gets viewed as "the one who accidently falls outside of the
great eqaulity of all -- the sick, the retarded or the forsaken to whom the community must
extended a hand in order to restablish the 'social bond,'" or "the radical other, the one who is
separated from the community from the mere fact of being alien to it." (Rancière 2009: 116) In
the ethical community, the only two options for women who do not fit is to hope the system
extends their hand or be antagonistic to the very project of gender equality.
Since 1992, there has been more and more focus on intersectionality, but even this goal
within the context of the ethical turn has proved to be empty. The answer to the need for
intersectionality in consensual times has not been to recognize the structural differences within
the group of women -- it has been to focus on the black women who seem to be proof that a hand
has been extended. Singer Beyoncè is often considered to be an important figure of 'fourth-wave
feminism' because finally we now have a strong, powerful black woman who holds a great deal
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of economic and social capital. One might think this is a sign that the structural differences
which divided different types of women have been solved; black women and white women can
now be declared equal. That is not the case -- what has instead happened is we see a reiteration
of what happened in '92, but now a figurative hand has been extended to wealthy black women.
In the year 2020, this ethical turn cannot only be seen in feminist politics but also that
which we consider feminist art. In fact, I have argued that the only true difference between the
third-wave and fourth-wave of feminism is precisely the fact that it has infiltrated culture on a
much larger scale. While the feminism of the 90's was focused on getting women into the
political realm, the feminism of the 21st century has been focused on injecting feminism into
everyday life. Calling oneself a feminist is no longer a radical statement. In fact, nowadays
(especially in liberal areas) people are as afraid to admit they are not feminists as women used to
be afraid to admit that they were. Directors and studios now have to be concerned -- does this
pass the Bechdel test, are the female characters three dimensional, do we have enough women
working on the project, etc. While this is not inherently a bad thing, it risks significantly
neutralizing the revolutionary potential of feminism and transferring onto it the empty goal of
'representation.' An analysis of the way women have been presented through an ethical lens can
help us better understand why 'representational' art can fall flat.
In her chapter on feminist art, Tina Chanter looks at art using the framework of consensus
and dissensus to argue for the revolutionairy power of feminist art. I believe her argument bears
taking a closer at to determine exactly how dissensual 'feminist' art can be in ethical times.
Chanter starts off by looking at the art of the Guerilla Girls, a feminist art collective from the late
80's made up of anonymous female artists. These women were mostly focused on making art that
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very directly highlighted the lack of female artists within museum and gallery spaces. Chanter
claims their art is dissensual because disputing "the distribution of bodies that informs whose
work is displayed in an art gallery is to contest the aesthetics determining what counts as art."
(Chanter 2018:145) She looks at the Guerilla Girls' most famous piece: Do Women Have to Be
Naked to Get into the Met. Museum?

I would argue that this artwork is less art than it is a political message. It takes a heteronomous
approach to the aesthetic experience, being created for the purpose of changing the society it is
being made in. The aesthetic experience which suspends autonomy and heteronomy is confused
with the work of art itself. Rancière reminds us that "political art cannot work in the simple
form of a meaningful spectacle that would lead to an awareness of the state of the world."
(Rancière 2004: 63) Chanter recognizes that this may be the first criticism of the work of the
Guerilla Girls. But to some degree, she rejects this instinct to write it off as such. She claims that
for Rancière, what is of concern is not only whether a work of art has crossed into political
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statement, but also whether or not that piece appeals to the consensual state or disrupts the police
order. She goes on to say that:
"Rather than assimilating this work by the Guerilla Girls to the pedagogical logic from
which Rancière seeks to distance art as dissensus, or critiquing it for its aspiration to
leave its status as art in order to become a political slogan that inspires collective action
according to the logic of consensus, let's consider from an alternative point of view this
work… It is of some interest here that this particular work concerns itself not only with
the art of politics, but also with the politics of art." (Chanter 2018: 149)
Some things need to be considered here. Chanter seems to be suggesting that within the
framework provided by Rancière, it is possible to have a work of art in the aesthetic regime that
dissolves the art into life and still maintains dissensual features. This seems to be in direct
contradiction with the very motto of politics of the aesthetics regime: "Let us save the
heterogenous sensible." (Rancière 2010: 124) Rancière consistently insists that we must maintain
this knot between art and life, because if we dissolve art into politics, politics also becomes
dissolved as well. To suggest that this work of art could somehow both fit into a heteronomous
model, and at the same time maintain the politics of art seems to be counterintuitive to the very
notion of aesthetics in Rancière puts forth.
Chanter's defense of this piece is that "it offers a commentary on the relationship between
the artist and the subject of the work of art. It does this not by asserting a political position, but
by posing a question." (Chanter 2018: 149) If we were to look at this piece as we looked at the
Juno Ludovisi, would it instill the same mutual enrichment of activity and passivity? It seems the
aesthetic experience to some degree is tied into the notion of free play between imagination and
understanding. One could then ask, is the imagination allowed an equal footing with the
understanding when one interacts with this work. Chanter is right in pointing out that it poses a
question, but it also poses that question along with two empirical observations meant to guide the
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viewers towards some specific understanding of women's roles in the art world. What naturally
follows from reading this question and these two facts is a logical conclusion that, yes, women
seem to have a much higher chance of being shown in the Met if they are nude in a painting than
if they are creating art.
Chanter sees the opposition between form and matter to take up a slightly different role in
this piece, though. She sees the category of woman as a passive matter which is typically
beholden to male subjectivity within the police order, and sees this work as suspending the
oppositions between form and matter by questioning male subjectivity. Chanter is correct in
suggesting that as a whole, women have served as passive matter in art made by men throughout
the years, but that still does not point to how this work of art engages in an aesthetic exchange. In
this case, the work of art is subsumed under the particularities of life. Although it critiques the
world around it, it does not do so, "without having to use the terms of a message as a
vehicle."(Rancière 2004: 63) The actual image on the piece, a nod to Jean-Auguste-Dominique
Ingres's La Grande Odalisque, functions almost entirely as branding for the Guerilla Girls, who
are famous for wearing gorilla masks on their heads. The truly effective part of the piece is the
words which point out the gender inequality in the art world. It would arguably achieve the same
ends if the image were removed and only words were left behind. In fact, the vast majority of the
Guerilla Girls' other works did not include any images, only words, and were able to achieve
similar ends as this one. All their work is remembered, first and foremost, for its ability to bring
awareness to inequality in the art world.
It seems to be engaging in a heteronomous political experience which does not maintain
the conjunction between art and life. The work of art is not able to maintain its own laws which
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have not been opposed upon it by ethics or representation. In fact, this work seems to be more
characteristic of the representative regime than it is the aesthetic regime. Debates over what
should be represented and how those things are represented are characteristic of the
representative regime. In the representative regime the concept of art does not exist as art does
not have autonomy; there is no singular 'art,' only arts. One could see how this work has potential
for a technical purpose of exposing the way women are being treated in the art world, but it does
not itself seem to be political art. Aesthetic dissensus has to be understood as a wholly separate
process than political dissensus. Aesthetic dissensus offers politics sites off which to build, but it
itself cannot inspire change -- it is characterized precisely by the lack of utility that comes out of
maintaining the knot between art and life. Chanter suggests there is two ways to look at this
piece; the first is as political slogan in which, "this work of art would thus fit seamlessly with the
'pedagogical' model, whereby a previously ignorant public is ostensibly enlightened through
exposure to a 'meaningful spectacle,' which elicits 'awareness' of the state of the world." (Chanter
2018: 148) In this case, it would abdicate its status as art because it would not maintain its
autonomy from life. The second way is the way she chooses to read it: as a suspension of active
form's dominance over passive matter. Although I sympathize with the desire to try to find the
dissensual power of the Guerilla Girls' work, I understood this piece to fall much closer in line
with the first interpretation she offers. Their goal was undoubtedly noble, but I struggle to
understand how their work can maintain its status as a work of art when its primary method of
disrupting the visible is through a pedagogical slogan.
Even the ability of this piece to inspire collective political action seems to be
questionable. In fact, since 1989 when the Guerilla Girls released this, women have not been
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shown in galleries at a particularly higher rate. As of September 2019, female artists still only
generate 2% of the art world's revenue. Not only is the female art market dwarfed by its male
counterpart, it is much more concentrated within the hands of a few artists. Five female artists -Yayoi Kusama, Joan Mitchell, Louise Bourgeois, Georgia O’Keeffe and Agnes Martin4 -account for as much as 40% of the market share. In comparison, the top five male artists account
for 8% of their market. Galleries seem to be slightly more equitable than the auction world. Of
the galleries surveyed in the Art Agency's study, women accounted for roughly 20-30% of artists
on display. (Burns et al. 2019) If the political purpose of the Guerilla Girls' work was to mobilize
the public to demand more female voices in the art world, it seems to have failed. Chanter,
quoting Rancière, claims that the Guerilla Girls "can be understood to pave the way for the
redefinition of 'the common of a community, to introduce into it new subjects and objects, to
render visible what has not been,' staging an implicit challenge to the ideal standards of beauty."
(Chanter 2018: 153) I feel that this is an overly generous account of the role the Guerilla Girls
have played.
The Guerilla Girls were undoubtedly effective in creating some sort of lasting impact.
The above work now hangs in the Tate Modern, and merchandising containing their brochures
can be found all over the internet (including their own website). But without a political spirit, the
mass-consumption of their work only reinforces gender essentialism in popular culture. The
Guerilla Girls may have been a feminist art collective of the 80's, but their messaging fits
perfectly within our consensual times. In their pieces, women appear as a monolith. And of
course, the woman who appears on their most well known work of art is a white one. There is no

4

In descending order of how much of the market share they claim.
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consideration of the struggles of particular women, and the interests of women are always
presented as being directly antagonistic to those of men. They tell us that not only do men
exclude women from the art world, men are also directly harming women by choosing to portray
their bodies naked. The consensual group, in this case women, is always at risk of attack from
male subjectivity if males are allowed their way. While the Guerilla Girls might have started
their project in the hopes of encouraging dissensual thought on who belonged in galleries, their
'art' has unfortunately has turned into empty slogans brandished on tee shirts and posters in
museum gift shops. This is not to say that consensus is always identical with commodification in
Rancière, but the commodification of the Guerilla Girls' slogans fits very much into the
consensual discourse of capitalist feminism which tells us that capital is the answer to all our
oppressions. Buying merchandise with gender essentialist messages on them and financially
supporting female artists (with no reference to the specific kinds of female artists which may
need support and why) is posited as the solution to female objectification within the art world.
The messages were consensual to begin with, and their widespread distribution even further
reinforces that consensus. They function to remind women they are oppressed while not actually
saying or doing much about the particular ways in which women are oppressed. On a wider
scale, they represent the ways in which the concept of 'feminist art' can be co-opted to establish
a notion of a monolithic woman being oppressed by men without actually offering the
opportunity for dissensus which should be at the core of the aesthetic experience.
Another key feature of the ethical turn that one can find at play in 21st century feminism
is the imposition of infinite trauma onto the consensual group. In October 2017, the New York
Times c ame out with an article detailing the many disturbing sexual assault allegations leveled
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against Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstien. Soon after, actress Alyssa Milano took to the
internet and encouraged women who had been victims of sexual assault to share the hashtag
#MeToo in order to spread awareness of the prevalence of assault. What followed was an
outpouring of women sharing their stories and a reckoning of many powerful men that had
perpetuated this violence. This moment, similarly to 9/11 marked a decisive cultural shift that
introduced a certain narrative of infinite trauma and reinforced a police order. At its most basic
level, the phenomena of men facing a reckoning for their abuse of women is something that
should be celebrated. But I would argue that certain aspects of the Me Too movement went
beyond justice in a way that ultimately depoliticized it and rendered it ineffective at speaking for
the rights of the oppressed.
I want to be clear here that the Me Too movement, as a whole, had important dissensual
moments which provided the foundation for positive political change. What I am not attempting
to do here is critique the act of bringing abusers to justice, or suggest that everything that
happened as a result of the Weinstein accusations reinforced the police order. What I wish to
critique is the ethicizing and consensualizing of sexual trauma that came to the fore as a result of
this moment. On the surface, the original #MeToo moment which spread across social media
seems to be a strong dissensual moment -- women were finally making men aware of the
violence that they had faced. In certain ways, it was very successful at doing this. On the other
hand, it did not seem to account for the particularities of the oppression of women and offered no
clear route towards justice. It was later revealed that Milano had taken the idea of the Me Too
hashtag from civil rights activist Tarana Burke, who had been trying to popularize it since 2006.
Milano was able to get it off the ground because she already existed upon the stage of women
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who were counted for. The hashtag cannot be credited entirely for the cultural fervor, though.
The allegations against Weinstein were also powerful enough to elicit the subsequent events. The
women who brought forth these allegations were mostly wealthy, beautiful, white actresses. It is
not that entertainement was the only industry with a sexual assault problem or that these were the
only women that were being assaulted and speaking up about it, it is that these were the kind of
women society already cared about. Anyone who felt underrepresented was not given a clear
avenue to critique the movement because in the ethical turn "there is no status for the excluded in
the structuration of the community." (Rancière 2009: 116)
The movement did not stay within the entertainment industry for long, though. Men in all
arenas begun to be accused of sexual assault, and many different kinds of women were
encouraged to step forward (although the accusors who were given the most attention and
credibility were still rich white women). To some degree, people were aware of consensualizing
of the faces of the movement and openly critical of it -- when Time Magazine named "the silence
breakers" their 2017 'person' of the year they were careful to profile people of all different
backgrounds. But in reality, the women who were at the greatest risk of gender violence -- sex
workers, domestic workers, undocumented women -- did not see much shift in their day to day
lives. Overall, not much legislation was not created to inscribe their rights into fact. Certain
states expanded protections for independent contractors and banned NDA's covering sexual
harassment, but the biggest material shift that this inspired was the creation of the Times Up
Legel Defense Fund. Hollywood women created this as a way for people to get free legal aid if
they wished to bring their accusers to justice. The creation of this fund and the women who
started it bring up the same issue Rancière discusses as a "return to sender" within the context of
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human rights. (Rancière 2004: 309) The women who have no rights to justice are gifted rights
that they cannot keep. They must return them to the sender and depend on the benevolence of
those with money and power to take them seriously.
And if this is a case of absolute victims in the face of an absolute evil, it becomes clear
who belongs on each side. While men can also be sexually assaulted, most of the Me Too
discourse has centered around women as victims and men as evil. In many ways, women are
presented as the symbol of the Other. What is at the center of this all is not, as one might assume,
the sexual assaults of particular people -- it is the false equivocation of male desire with the gaze.
In order to elucidate the differences between male desire and the gaze, I will turn to Kaja
Silverman's analysis of Fassbinder. Fassbinder's films are commonly understood to operate upon
an 'aesthetics of pessimism.' Fassbinder has been stated to have a "radical refusal to affirm," "a
repudiation of positivity in any shape or form," an "aversion to the fictions which make psychic
and social existence intolerable." (Silverman 1992: 125) Although Fassbinder has been accused
of being sexist or racist, Silverman believes that is not at the core of this pessimism. Rather, what
is placed at risk is "identity itself, which is no longer able to secure an 'interior' foothold."
(Silverman 1992: 126) In psychoanalysis, identity formation requires the internalization of forces
which are originally external. This is the case with the Lacanian mirror stage in which one builds
their identity through mirror images, parental figures, and later on through cultural
representations. It is also the case with the gaze. The Lacanian gaze is first realized in the
mother's look at her infant as it "facilitates the join of the infant and the mirror image, and later
through all of the many other actual looks with which it is confused." (Silverman 1992: 126)
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The experience of the gaze can then be operated by the subject themselves and they can
submit themselves to the experience of being seen even when no one else is watching. This is
only a secondary experience, though. It must begin as an external phenomena. This being said,
for Lacan, it becomes central to the notion of identity:
"However, consciousness as it is redefined by Lacan hinges not only upon the
internalization but the elision of the gaze; this 'seeing' of oneself being seen is
experienced by the subject-of-consciousness -- by the subject, that is, who arrogates to
itself a certain self-presence or sustainability -- as a seeing of itself seeing itself."
(Silverman 1992: 126-7)
The important feature of Fassbinder's films, according to Silverman, is that it brings to the fore
this externality of the gaze. The identity of the characters remains removed from the concept of
self -- making clear how dependent they are upon the exterior to affirm themselves. The clear
exteriorization of the gaze is one major feature of Fassbinder's cinema, but another equally
important one, especially within the context of gender, is the separation of the gaze from the
look. The gaze is something abstract, which cannot come from any particular viewers, whereas
the look (or the eye) "'[sees] only from one point.'" (Silverman 1992: 129) To associate the gaze
with a person or a group of people misunderstands its nature. "The relationship between eye and
gaze is thus analogous in certain ways to that which links penis and phallus; the former can stand
in for the latter, but can never approximate it." (Silverman 1992: 129) It is common in feminist
film theory to associate the gaze with a male voyeurism, but this misses the fact that the gaze is
an abstract concept which demands an internalization that cannot be affirmed by the male
voyeur. This stems from a misunderstanding of the true nature of the Lacanian gaze. In fact, the
person most likely to be subjected to the gaze is the vouyer himself. Silverman explains that "the
look might also be said to exceed the gaze -- to carry a libidinal supplement which relegates it, in
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turn, to a scopic subordination. The gaze, in other words, remains outside desire, the look
stubbornly within." (Silverman 1992: 130) It is, thus, the look that we must discuss when we
discuss the possible violence of male desire.
The conversation has thus far largely centered around punishing bad men, not
understanding what causes men to be bad. We infantilize men, saying that boys will be boys and
the (sometimes violent) sexual urges of men are unavoidable. We are told that as long as men
and women coexist, men will want to do bad things to them. And instead of understanding why
the urges exist, we focus on dissuading men from acting on them. Women exist as the emblem of
the irreducible Otherness, and either men can submit themselves to the Other, or they can try to
conquer it by violating women. Women, on the other hand, are imparted with an infinite trauma.
In this case, sexual "trauma has become the trauma of being born," a woman. (Rancière 2009:
113) We are told men are evil, men only want us for our bodies, men will hurt us if we are not
too cautious, etc. None of these narratives are particularly new, but what is novel is the progress
they are being dressed up in. In many ways, the sexual liberation of the 1970's maintained
oppressive gender roles, but began to disguise them in the hedonistic notion of choice. In the
same way, the Me Too movement has maintained that the male violence of the 20th century is
inevitable, but has created the guise that this can somehow be remedied by infinite justice.
One example of this infinite justice was in December 2019 when Alyssa Milano, who had
built a career out of advocating for victims of assault since 2017, pulled her support for Andrew
Yang's campaign over the fact that one of his aides had been accused of sexaul misconduct.
Some might argue that the misconduct of an aide has nothing to do with Yang's political
platform or even his own ethical compass, but Milano was not concerned with the particulars of
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the situation. In many ways, the machine that had been created in the wake of the Weinstein
allegations was not concerned with navigating the distinctions between law and fact. It sees itself
as the avenger defending the absolute victims in the face of the absolute evil, and anyone this
evil might touch is a necessary casualty.
The unknowable trauma of women then contributes to the unknowable trauma (and rage)
of men. In the wake of Me Too, men have felt a new sort of fear in that they now exist within a
society that seems to them to have little care for the validity of their own word when it comes to
sexual assault. Men fear that if a woman one day wakes up and decides she wants to falsely
accuse him of rape, his life will be ruined and there is little he can do about it. Some would say
this is poetic justice for the many years women have spent not being believed about their rapes -I would say it is no real justice at all, it is a repayment of violence with violence. Not only does
this environment have the potential to traumatize the men within it, it contributes to their own
negative feelings towards women; which they may turn around and repay to women in the form
of sexual violence. Like the characters of Mystic River they remain stuck in a circle of endless
trauma, doomed to either impart it on someone else or submit to it in silence. It is also quite
important that the submitting be in silence. Male desire is posited at this infinite evil -something that cannot and should not be explained. For men to come out and admit the violence
they may feel towards women would amount to evil within the dominant ethical order.
Silverman reminds us that the look must be acknowledged "not only as a carrier of libido, but as
a signifier of castration." There is a "void which is at the core of subjectivity, a void which gives
rise not only to anxiety, but to desire." (Silverman 1992: 130) This dualism of the look is what is
too commonly ignored. To equate the look, which is rooted in the desire to affirm one's
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manliness and the fear of losing it, to an internally violent gaze ignores complexities of desire. It
ignores the fact that men also depend upon the exterior to affirm their identity, and when male
desire is so commonly associated with violence, mens only choices are to accept this violence as
part of their desire or forgo their manhood.
Women have no better choices. Female desire is often understood to be tied into making
oneself an object. Silverman thinks this is a misunderstanding of the representation of women:
"If feminist theory has a reason to lament that system of representation, it is not because
women so frequently function as the objects of desire (we all function simultaneously as
subject and object), but because the male look transfers it's own lack to the female
subject, and attempts to pass it off as the gaze. The problem, in other words, is not that
men direct desire towards women in Hollywood films, but that male desire is so
consistently and systematically imbricated with projection and control." (Silverman 1992:
144)
This objectivity is forced upon women, and as a result it is quite common for women's fantasies
to involve submitting to violence of some sort. But they are told time and time again that men are
evil, and that if they choose to engage with men they are asking for any violence they receive.
Women are told they must either consent or not consent -- and when they come out of a sexual
encounter feeling violated their only avenue through which to understand that is by seeing the
sexual encounter as non-consensual. If they reject that option and maintain their consent, they
must suffer that violation in silence. Women can either be objects of male desire or deny
themselves their femininity. Part of the narrative of control that is thrust upon them also denotes
a certain requirement of purity. The binary of male subjectivity and female objectivity suggests
that women must not have any libidinal desire in the first place. If women do express any control
over their own libidinal energy, the violence they may be subjected to is seen as justified. Their
idea is that they have stepped outside of the socially mandated way of being, therefore they

82

deserve to be forced back into a position of victim. The gaze (or the law) subsumes the look (or
the fact), ignoring the ways in which libidinal desire can be informed by social realities.
Silverman goes on to suggest what feminism must demonstrate "over and over again is that all
subjects, male or female, rely for their identity upon the repertoire of culturally available images,
and upon a gaze which radically exceeding the libidinally vulnerable look, is not theirs to
deploy." (Silverman 1992: 153) When this reality is ignored, both men and women are reduced
to their sexual desires, and within an ethical regime turned into either villain or victim.
This does not necessarily have to follow the rules of these gender binaries, we have seen
reckonings in the Me Too movement involving gay people or even women preying on men. But
in all such cases, the normative gender binary has been replaced by some other dynamic of
power (be it age, wealth, social capital, etc.). What is common in all these scenarios is the
existence of a violent power holder and a victim who exemplifies the Other they wish to
conquer. The victim either becomes subject to the sexual violence, or the originator of the desire
ignores it and submits to the law of the Other. But even if the latter happens, the victim remains
subject to sexual trauma because the look is equated to an unknowable, violent gaze. It remains
constantly on the surface, ready to boil up and enact evil, and the only thing that can keep it at
bay is infinite justice. And, of course, complications arise in situations which divulge from the
narrative. This became evidently clear this spring when Tara Reade, a former Joe Biden staffer
accused the presidential candidate of sexual assault. Milano, a Biden campaign surrogate, took
the Me Too hashtag off her social media accounts and backpedalled to say that she believes
Biden, and suggested maybe we should not believe all women all the time. One could possibly
read this shift as a positive change towards approaching sexual assault in a more dissensual
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manner, but I veer cynical. I think what was at play here was a fear of damaging the broader
ethical cause, because she sees Donald Trump as a perpetrator of more evil than Biden. There is
no space to think through the possibility that perhaps Biden is guilty. If Milano had followed the
lead of Joan Dark, this could have been her moment to realize that her own morality had been
ineffective, and taken that opportunity to adopt a more militant morality. Working for someone
who had perpetrated a violence did not have to indicate she herself was guilty -- Joan was not a
bad person because she aligned herself with an ineffective morality. In fact, her being willing to
see this ineffectiveness and denounce it is precisely what makes her the embodiment of
goodness. Instead of taking that route, Milano showed us how empty her cause was to begin with
given that it fell inwards on itself the second something came to the fore which did not fit neatly
within the binary of good and evil. The 'rights' given to women following the Me Too movement
were proved to be predicated on the movements desire to enforce them.
I have mentioned some of the consequences of this shift in the realm of politics, but truly
the best place to look in order to understand this ethical turn is the screen. As I have mentioned,
the Me Too movement did not inspire as many significant legislative changes as it did cultural
shifts. Looking at a film inspired by this turn will help us better understand its implications.
Dubbed a "blackly comedic quasi-thriller for the MeToo age," Emerald Fennell's Promising
Young Woman5 follows the story of Cassandra (Harvey 2020). Cassandra works in a coffee shop
by day, and by night she goes out to clubs pretending to be highly intoxicated, lets herself be
taken home by predatory men, and then confronts them about their actions right as they are about

Due to the COVID19 pandemic, the public release of this film was delayed. Therefore I have unfortunately had to
base my analysis off of the script. All the plot points I have pulled from the script were also discussed within the
critic reviews from the Sundance 2020 release. Given that, I have reason to believe the film has mostly stayed true to
script, but please be aware I have yet to see the actual film.
5
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to violate her. At first we are not told why she is doing this, but we see her obsessively keeping
track of the men she has confronted and the potential women she believes herself to have saved.
As time goes on, the film slowly reveals to us why Cassandra has chosen this life. Cassandra
used to be in school to be a doctor when her best friend Nina was raped by another friend. No
one but Cassandra believed Nina about the assault, which drives Nina to commit suicide. This
leaves Cassandra traumatized, and she drops out of medical school, moves home, and begins to
wage her campaign of vigilante justice.
Unlike a typical revenge fantasy movie, Cassandra is not trying to punish these men for
their crimes -- she merely wishes to educate them, and make them question the way they treat
women. At first, this film seems to be a refreshing deviation from the rhetoric of the Me Too
movement; after all, she seems focused on education rather than punishment, but things begin to
devolve quickly. Ryan, an old friend from medical school comes into town, and they begin a
romantic relationship. Through Ryan, Cassandra learns that Nina's rapist is living a happy life
and engaged to be married. This sends her into a spiral, determined to bring everyone involved to
justice. She retaliates in ways such as getting a former classmate intoxicated and setting her up to
believe she's been raped, as well as pretending to kidnap the daughter of the medical school dean
and leaving her in a place where she is vulnerable to rape. The movie is careful not have
Cassandra ever perpetuate any rape; she is just meant to make everyone around her feel the
trauma that her and Nina were subject to. She eventually finds a video of the event that shows
Ryan, her new boyfriend, in the room while it happened. Again, the film reminds us that men can
and should not be trusted, even the ones who seem as though they care for us. Aflame with rage,
she forces Ryan to give her the rapist's location so that she can finally extract her revenge.
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Cassandra tries to kill the perpetrator, but he ends up killing her instead. Her death is written off
as a suicide, and all seems to be calm until the final twist, in which it is revealed Cassandra sent
the video out to everyone she knew as a backup plan.
Promising Young Woman takes the theme of Mystic River a nd reverses it. This time the
movie is about the falsely vindicated, but does this ultimately in service of the same grand
narrative: the ethical one. To start, Nina and her assault, the source of all this trauma are never
shown in the movie. One might understand why Fennell steers clear of depicting the rape or the
suicide, but even Nina herself is never shown to us in the flashbacks. She quite literally serves as
the unrepresentable Other -- that which can never truly be shown, yet still places the entire story
under the yoke of testifying to her trauma. I suspect this was a deliberate choice by Fennell to
make Nina into anyone or everyone that we want her to be. The movie is not about one woman's
trauma. Nina serves as the figurehead for the trauma all women are subject to simply due to the
misfortune of being born a woman. And the trauma Nina has left behind is one that lies in a zone
of indistinction "between psychic disturbance and social unrest." (Rancière 2009: 116)
Cassandra, left behind with this trauma, either has the choice of succumbing to it or pushing it
out into the world around her. At first she does this in a seemingly benign way, but she shows as
time goes on that she will not be satisfied until she is able to make everyone feel her pain.
Cassandra's campaign of revenge fits perfectly within the narrative of infinite justice. For
Cassandra, doling out justice comes not in the form of seeing people reprimanded for their part,
but making others feel her same pain. She does not go after the dean in an attempt to get her
fired; she wants to make the dean feel the trauma of having a loved one violated in that way. She
wants to make her classmate feel what it's like to be violated. One could argue this makes her
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much better than if she was actually orchestrating these rapes, but what is at the center of this
movie is not the rape itself, it is the trauma of male violence. To actually set those women up to
be violated would not work with the story because the story is not truly concerned with the
particulars of Nina's assault. Nina, like Antigone, just exists as the figurehead of trauma that has
no beginning or end. Like Antigone, she seems ultimately helpless to put up a valiant fight
against the law of the Gaze. While we originally believe Cassandra to be successfully defying,
she ultimately suffers a brutal and senseless death. Her death seems to happen to attest solely to
the existence of female suffering and victimhood. If she is a martyr, the cause she dies for is
martyrdom itself. Honig writes of Antigone that "here tragedy’s power is not that it redeems
suffering, but that it exemplifies it in ways that highlight what many think to be the human’s
most basic common denominator – the capacity to feel pain and suffering," (Honig 2013: 18) but
she may have as well been writing about Cassandra. Cassandra was never meant to avenge Nina,
she was meant to represent suffering without reason.
Cassandra gives back to everyone exactly what she got, until it comes time to bring the
actual assaulter to heel. Just as Rancière argued Flaubert had to kill Emma Bovary for her crime
of romanticizing the world, I would argue Fennell had to kill Cassandra for her crime of trusting
a man -- of allowing any room for nuance. Up until she finds the video, Cassandra is a calm,
measured arbiter of infinite justice, imparting sexually-rooted trauma onto all that dared question
Nina's. It is arguably Ryan's transgression that sets her into this fit of rage. She allowed her guard
down for a moment and allowed herself to believe that people did not have to exist within this
binary of good and evil. Fennell quickly reminds her that no, they must, and when she is caught
up in her own failure to submit to the law of the Other she goes too far and gets herself killed.
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Fennell also seems to be killing off her main character in the interest of making her a martyr.
While I understood this attempt, it ultimately fell flat. Unlike Joan Dark, Cassandra does not
sacrifice herself to save someone else. Her life is taken at the hands of the man who took her best
friend's life, and for the most part, the people who helped cover it up get off free. Cassandra
manages to expose Nina's rapist beyond the grave, but similarly at the end of Dogville one is left
wondering what was the point of it all? Cassandra could have easily brought him to justice and
saved her own life, but instead she succumbs to the same senseless evil which started it all. And
even when that particular evil is dealt with by the video, we remember all the men Cassandra had
ticked off in her notebook and the bruises they would leave on her arms. For the one that
Cassandra manages to bring down, there exists hundreds more notches in that notebook waiting
to dole out the next trauma in the cycle of endless traumas.
Through this analysis of Promising Young Women, I have attempted to show what
happens when ethics is imparted upon sexuality. In order to address the problem of sexual
violence, we must move towards a more dissensual understanding of gender relations and
subjectivity. All-encompassing violence needs to be dissociated with male subjectivity in order
for us to better understand the particularities of sexual violence. We should also attempt to
examine female subjectivity, and the ways in which violence can go hand in hand with female
desire as well. It is only through this sort of analysis that meaningful political action can be
inspired. In order for feminism to be recoupled with the real political community -- the
designation of "Woman" must be cast away in favor of understanding women as a complex body
of people. Rancière's ethical turn provides us with a comprehensive structure to understand the
failures of 21st century feminism and its relation to a culture of capital. Bringing politics back
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into feminism will require a rejection of the notions of good and evil, victim and villain. While
this may be uncomfortable for some at first, this will only benefit all subjects within the
community in the long run -- freeing them from the yoke of infinite trauma.
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